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Does Research with Children Violate the Best 
Interests Standard? 
An Empirical and Conceptual Analysis
Seema Shah*
ABSTRACT
Even as research with children has increasingly been recognized as urgently 
needed for generating effective treatments for childhood diseases, drug formulations for 
infants and young children, and dosages appropriate for children, it has remained 
controversial. Scholars have engaged in heated debates over whether non-beneficial 
research with children is morally and legally justified. On one point, however, there has 
been agreement: Whether they support or criticize pediatric research, commentators 
generally assume that pediatric research should be justified under the “best interests of 
the child” legal standard. This assumption not only threatens important research and 
public health interventions, but it is also incorrect. This Article challenges conventional 
wisdom by arguing that research does not have to be in a child’s best interests to be 
legally permissible.
The best interests standard is generally understood as the governing principle for 
legal decisions about children, particularly in the medical context. Nevertheless, the best 
interests standard operates in two different ways that have very different implications—
treating a child’s best interests as paramount versus as a primary consideration. Both 
versions of the standard fail to account adequately for the interests of others. Yet, the 
history of best interests standard reveals that the child’s best interests were rarely 
considered in isolation of other the interests. In a variety of contexts, moreover, legal 
scholars have criticized the best interests standard for failing to take account of the 
interests of people other than the child. This concern applies with special urgency to 
certain medical and public health decisions. An empirical analysis reveals that the 
history and criticisms have not been effective in changing how courts oversee medical 
decision making involving children.
Insofar as it places the interests of the child above all other interests, the best 
interests standard is a legal fiction that should not be applied to public health decisions 
in general and pediatric research in particular. Attempts to fix the current standard are 
unlikely to work, largely because of the confusion already engendered by the different 
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versions of the standard. Instead, legislators should adopt a new legal standard, the 
“secure child standard,” for public health decision making: Parents should be given 
discretion to make decisions for children unless their decisions are likely to cause 
unjustified harm to the child. The secure child standard will lead to more transparency 
and prevent poor decision making in the contexts of public health and biomedical 
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INTRODUCTION
A recent class action lawsuit claims that a prestigious research institution treated 
children from low-income minority families as “guinea pigs.” The lawsuit alleges that 
research on varying levels of lead paint removal unduly exposed young children in 
Baltimore to risk,1 reviving past controversy over a 2001 decision that the same lead 
paint study was contrary to law for violating the “best interests of the child” legal 
                                                          
1 Complaint at 1–2, Armstrong v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., No. 1:11-cv-03380 (N.D. Md., filed Nov. 22, 
2011). 
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standard.2 It is perhaps no surprise that the court applied the best interests standard to the 
context of research with children since this standard is widely considered to be the default 
legal standard in many situations involving minors. 
Similar examples of recent controversy over pediatric research abound. For 
instance, a U.S. government advisory panel recommended that an anthrax vaccine be 
tested on children, justifying the research as being in the best interests of children, their 
parents, and the U.S. government.3 This recommendation was hotly contested and 
criticized in the media as unlikely to benefit the children involved in the research, and 
only likely to help other children in the (perhaps unlikely) event of a widespread anthrax 
attack in the future.4 The Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues was
asked by the Secretary of Health and Human Services to render an opinion on whether 
research on countermeasures to an anthrax attack can proceed.5 Applying the existing 
risk/benefit balance in the U.S. Federal regulations to the case at hand, the Presidential
Commission determined that before a bioterrorism attack occurs, research can only 
proceed if it poses minimal risk (except under extraordinary circumstances).6 If designing
a minimal risk study is impossible, research prior to a bioterrorism attack can proceed if it 
involves no more than a minor increase over minimal risk, undergoes review by a special 
panel, and satisfies additional ethical protections specified in the report.7 The 
Commission opined that parental permission for research requires that parents determine 
what is in the child’s “best or essential interests,” but did not directly address whether a 
best interests requirement would preclude non-beneficial research.8 Concluding that its 
report was not the final word, the Commission stated that pediatric research involving 
medical countermeasures to potential terrorist attacks “warrants an ongoing national 
conversation in order to ensure the highest standards of protection for children that reflect 
an unwavering commitment to safeguard all children from unacceptable risks in research 
and through research that promotes their health and well-being.”9
Notwithstanding these and other controversies over pediatric research, there has 
been one area of consistent agreement: unless research is in a child’s best interests, it 
cannot be legally justified. Because the primary aim of research is to generate new 
knowledge for the benefit of society and future patients, research may directly conflict 
with the “best interests of the child” legal standard. An unstated reality is that research 
                                                          
2 Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 782 A.2d 807, 853 (Md. 2001).
3 NATIONAL BIODEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD, DRAFT REPORT: CHALLENGES IN THE USE OF ANTHRAX 
VACCINE ADSORBED (AVA) IN THE PEDIATRIC POPULATION AS A COMPONENT OF POST-EXPOSURE 
PROPHYLAXIS 1, 18–19 (2011), available at
http://www.phe.gov/Preparedness/legal/boards/nbsb/meetings/Documents/ava-pediatric-execsum.pdf. 
4 Lisa Schnirring, HHS Anthrax Vaccine Advisors Weigh Pediatric Use, CENTER FOR INFECTIOUS DISEASE 
RESEARCH & POLICY (Sept. 22, 2011), 
http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/cidrap/content/bt/anthrax/news/sep2211anthrax.html.
5 Letter from Kathleen Sebelius, Sec’y of Health and Human Serv., to Amy Gutmann, Ph.D., Chair of the 
Presidential Comm’n for the Study of Bioethical Issues., Pediatric Countermeasures Letter (Jan. 11, 2012), 
available at http://bioethics.gov/cms/node/633.
6 PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, SAFEGUARDING CHILDREN:
PEDIATRIC MEDICAL COUNTERMEASURE RESEARCH 56 (2013).
7 Id. at 87.
8 Id. at 26.
9 Id. at 105.
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participants are often exposed to risk in order to produce knowledge that can be used to 
help others in the future. This means that in many cases, research participants incur the 
risks of experimental treatments but are unlikely to personally benefit. When research is 
non-beneficial for the participants, individual consent to take on risk is very important. 
Yet, this ethical protection applies imperfectly to pediatric research. Children cannot 
legally give their own consent, and it is widely accepted that parents can only consent to 
activities that are in their children’s best interests.
Because of the tremendous confusion the best interests standard has sown, and its 
rhetorical appeal, the standard has been reflexively applied by the courts to cases 
involving pediatric research. Some courts describe the principle as “paramount” or “the 
overriding concern” throughout the law governing children, and particularly so in 
medical decision making.10 Courts applying the “paramount interpretation” of the best 
interests standard often understand the best interests standard to require that the best 
interests of the child determine the outcome in any case in which a child is a primary 
actor.11 Within debates over the legality of pediatric research, scholars have largely 
accepted this same premise.
Yet legal scholars in constitutional and family law have criticized the best interests 
standard (and the paramount interpretation in particular) for a number of years for its 
complete inability to account for the interests of others. In fact, over fifteen years ago the 
U.S. Supreme Court explained that: 
“The best interests of the child,” a venerable phrase familiar from divorce 
proceedings, is a proper and feasible criterion for making the decision as to 
which of two parents will be accorded custody. But it is not traditionally the 
sole criterion—much less the sole constitutional criterion—for other, less 
narrowly channeled judgments involving children, where their interests 
conflict in varying degrees with the interests of others.12
Although this statement seeks to clarify the place of the best interests standard in a 
broader range of decisions, it has not been effective. Courts apply two inconsistent 
interpretations of the best interests standard. In the most common interpretation, some 
                                                          
10 See, e.g., Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 782 A.2d 807, 853 (Md. 2001) (“We have long stressed 
that the ‘best interests of the child’ is the overriding concern of this Court in matters relating to children.”); 
In re Willmann, 493 N.E.2d 1380, 1389–90 (Ohio Ct. App. 1986) (“[T]he court has the right, in law, to 
order the treatment prescribed for David because the court stands in loco parentis and possesses the 
authority to preserve David's well-being and best interests. . . .  Adults are ordinarily free to make choices 
denied to those of less than full age, but when those choices threaten the welfare of a child, the state must 
intervene.”); Dietrich v. Anderson, 43 A.2d 186, 191–92 (Md. 1945) (describing the welfare of the child as 
being “of transcendent importance” and noting that the “paramount purpose of securing the welfare and 
promoting the best interests of the children” is something that “not only applies in cases of dispute between 
parents as to the custody of their children, but applies to all cases where those interests are in jeopardy.”).
11 See Loretta M. Kopelman, The Best Interests Standard as Threshold, Ideal, and Standard of 
Reasonableness, 22 J. MED. & PHIL. 271, 277 (1997) (defining the best interests standard as “acting so as to 
promote maximally the good of the individual”) (citing ALAN E. BUCHANAN & DAN W. BROCK, DECIDING 
FOR OTHERS: THE ETHICS OF SURROGATE DECISION MAKING 88 (1989)).
12 Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 303–04 (1993).
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courts consider a child’s best interests to be paramount and to trump all other interests 
(the “paramount interpretation”). Alternatively, other courts make decisions more along 
the lines of what the Supreme Court recommended and evaluate the child’s interests as a 
primary, but not sole consideration (the “primary interpretation”).13
Notwithstanding the confusion engendered by different versions of the standard, 
both interpretations of the best interests standard are problematic as applied to a range of 
public health decisions. The paramount interpretation is too strict to permit reasonable 
decisions involving public health decision making, including but not limited to pediatric 
research. The paramount interpretation is also hard to apply to particular cases. 
Furthermore, the paramount interpretation might be better thought of as a legal fiction 
because courts often claim to be applying the paramount interpretation of the best 
interests standard while truly applying a different standard. The primary interpretation is 
more flexible, but still inadequate for good public health decision making. Although the 
primary interpretation does not prohibit pediatric research in the way that a literal 
interpretation of the paramount interpretation might, it is still poorly suited to capture the 
complex trade-offs involved in advancing the public’s health and the interests of others. 
Pediatric research that poses net risk therefore appears to conflict with the best 
interests standard. At the same time, the importance of pediatric research in developing 
therapies is now widely acknowledged. Most of the debate from the scholarly community 
has therefore focused upon the narrow question of whether parents have the legal 
authority to enroll their children in research that poses risks and is designed to help 
others. Yet the larger issue—whether the best interests standard is the appropriate legal 
test for pediatric research—has rarely been questioned. Jurisprudence and scholarship 
focusing on pediatric research have both failed to ask the essential question of whether 
the best interest standard should govern. Instead, the conventional approach is to try to 
reconcile the best interest standard with the need to conduct research to advance the 
public’s health. This conventional approach is fundamentally misguided.  
The primary thrust of this Article is that participation in pediatric research should 
not have to be legally justified as being in a child’s best interests.14 It is a mistake to 
apply the “best interests” standard to the context of pediatric research because it is ill-
suited to contend with the trade-offs involved, and such an approach is likely very costly 
to the public. Despite the recognition of the problems with the best interests standard in 
some quarters, empirical analysis demonstrates that judges persist in applying the 
paramount interpretation of the best interests standard in medical decisions involving 
children. 
Although one approach might be to clarify the best interests standard at a 
theoretical level, this approach is unlikely to succeed. Rather, pediatric research should 
                                                          
13 David William Archard, Children’s Rights, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (2010), 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rights-children/#BesInt.
14 This Article provides a legal analysis of non-beneficial research and proposes a new legal standard, with 
a more limited discussion of the ethical justifications for non-beneficial pediatric research. The argument is 
descriptive as to what the current legal standard for pediatric research is and normative with respect to what 
that legal standard should be, but it would require much more space to comprehensively address the ethical 
justification for pediatric research as well. For a thorough treatment of the ethical justifications for non-
beneficial pediatric research, see generally DAVID S. WENDLER, THE ETHICS OF PEDIATRIC RESEARCH
(2010).
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be measured under an altogether different legal standard. This Article argues for a new 
legal standard, the “secure child standard,” to govern legal rules and decisions involving 
children. 
In Part I of this Article, I provide background on pediatric research and the debate 
over its moral and legal justifications. I discuss the historical development of the best 
interests standard in Part II, draw out modern-day implications, and examine criticisms of 
the best interests standard from legal and ethical scholars. Part III provides results of an 
empirical analysis of the use of the best interests standard in medical decisions involving 
children in the past forty years. In Part IV, I explain that the paramount interpretation of 
the best interests standard is a legal fiction, and argue that we should not retain the best 
interests standard. In Part V, I propose the “secure child standard” as an alternative 
approach to legal decision making involving children in research and other interventions 
that are needed to further public health. Under the secure child standard, parents are given 
discretion to make decisions for their children unless they pose unjustified risks of 
significant harm to the child. When there is evidence that children are being exposed to a 
risk of significant harm, courts should determine whether parents have appropriately 
balanced the competing considerations. Courts should not allow children to be exposed to 
unjustified harm or harm that is unacceptably high. I conclude that the secure child 
standard will better explain courts’ decisions and that adopting the secure child standard 
can improve the clarity and soundness of future court decisions, prevent courts from 
reaching the wrong conclusions in nascent legal areas, and ensure that our policies 
concerning children have a sound foundation. 
I. BACKGROUND: PEDIATRIC RESEARCH
The importance of pediatric research has only been recognized relatively recently. 
In 1973, one survey found that 78% of prescription drugs did not have enough data or 
information in their labeling about their use in children.15 By 1991, this number had 
grown to 81% of drugs.16 Many commentators have pointed out several reasons to be 
concerned about lacking information on how medical interventions work in children. 
Some have succinctly noted that “children are not just small adults.”17 Others have 
argued that: (1) children are physiologically different from adults; (2) children often 
process drugs differently in their bodies (and sometimes process them differently at
different stages of childhood); (3) some diseases occur only in children or behave very 
differently in children; (4) infants and very young children are generally unable to take 
medication in solid form, unlike most adults; (5) infants are exposed to unique modes of 
disease transmission through birth or breastfeeding; and (6) at various stages of 
development, children may be at risk of developmental problems as side effects of 
                                                          
15 American Academy of Pediatrics Committee on Drugs, Guidelines for the Ethical Conduct of Studies to 
Evaluate Drugs in Pediatric Populations, 95 PEDIATRICS 286, 286 (1995).
16 Id.
17 Terry P. Klassen, Lisa Hartling, Jonathan C. Craig & Martin Offringa, Children Are Not Just Small 
Adults: The Urgent Need for High-Quality Trial Evidence in Children, 5 PLOS MED. 1180,1180 (2008).
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medication.18 These theoretical concerns have been borne out by the results of recent 
pediatric research in drugs that were already approved for use in adults, which have 
shown unexpected safety findings related to neurological side effects, a failure to achieve 
reliable amounts of the drug in the body, and even increased mortality.19
Because of these differences, research does not always mean exposing patients to 
greater risk. In fact, there are some fields where almost all patients are enrolled in 
research, such as the field of pediatric oncology,20 and this fact is what many consider 
responsible for improvement in survival rates over time.21 For multiple reasons, studying 
a particular treatment in adults cannot give the full picture of how that same drug will 
work in children. And without data to establish how a drug works in children, the result is 
that physicians conduct ad hoc experimentation on their patients—treating a child 
without knowing whether a drug will work, what the risks of giving it might be, or which 
dose is the right one. 
Although the importance of pediatric research is clear, one important justification 
for conducting research in adults does not apply to children. Adults typically give their 
own consent to take on risk for the sake of others. Adults who can consent can protect 
their own interests by deciding to participate in research only when they think the risks 
are acceptable. In general, children cannot legally give consent for themselves; parents or 
legal guardians give permission for children to be in research. The fact that parents must 
decide whether their children can enroll in research has given rise to concern that parents 
have conflicts of interest that may prevent them from making decisions that appropriately 
weigh their children’s interests.22
Recognizing the complex ethical issues arising in pediatric research, Congress 
created the National Commission for Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and 
Behavioral Research in 1974, making one of its charges to write a report on the ethics of 
                                                          
18 Christopher-Paul Milne & Jon B. Bruss, The Economics of Pediatric Formulation Development for Off-
Patent Drugs, 30 CLIN. THERAPEUTICS 2133, 2139 (2008).
19 Daniel K. Benjamin, et al., Safety and Transparency of Pediatric Drug Trials, 163 ARCH PEDIATRICS 
ADOLESCENT MED. 1080, 1082 (2009).
20 Yoram Unguru, Annie M. Sill & Naynesh Kamani, The Experiences of Children Enrolled in Pediatric 
Oncology Research: Implications for Assent, 125 PEDIATRICS e876, e876 (2010).
21 There is a common view that pediatric patients enrolled in clinical trials have higher rates of survival and 
show greater improvement than those who are not involved in research. See Jeffrey M. Peppercorn et al., 
Comparison of Outcomes in Cancer Patients Treated Within and Outside Clinical Trials: Conceptual 
Framework and Structured Review, 363 LANCET 263, 263 (2004) (“The belief that clinical trials offer the 
best treatment for patients with cancer is widespread in the oncology community.”). There is some 
evidence to support this claim. See S.P. Hunger et al., Improved Survival for Children and Adolescents with 
Acute Lymphoblastic Leukemia between 1990 and 2005: A Report from the Children's Oncology Group, 30 
J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 1663, 1666 (2012); Paul S. Gaynon et al., Long-term Results of the Children's 
Cancer Group Studies for Childhood Acute Lymphoblastic Leukemia 1983–2002: a Children's Oncology 
Group Report, 24 LEUKEMIA 285, 291 (2010). There may not be sufficient evidence, however, to be certain 
of its validity. Peppercorn, et al., supra note 21, at 267. (“In our review of the published work, we found 
little high quality evidence to support the pervasive belief that cancer trial participation leads to improved 
outcomes.”).
22 Holly Fernandez Lynch, Give Them What They Want? The Permissibility of Pediatric Placebo-
Controlled Trials Under the Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act, 16 ANNALS HEALTH L. 79, 87–88 
(2007); Efi Rubenstein, Comment, Going Beyond Parents and Institutional Review Boards in Protecting 
Children Involved in Nontherapeutic Research, 33 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 251, 252 (2003).
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research with children.23 The National Commission relied on the work of many scholars 
but two in particular, Paul Ramsey and Richard McCormick.24 Based on its analysis of 
the literature, the National Commission issued recommendations that research with 
children is important to conduct and that with additional protections and limitations on 
the risks and benefits to which children can be exposed, research with children can be 
ethical.25 These recommendations were subsequently codified into federal regulations 
governing research with children in 1983, and have not been revised since that time.26
The federal regulations governing research with children permit research with 
children in four categories: (1) research that is not likely to benefit a child and poses 
minimal risks, (2) research that may benefit the child directly and poses risks that are 
outweighed by the benefits, (3) research that will not benefit the child directly, but poses 
a minor increase over minimal risk and is likely to generate knowledge about the child’s 
disorder or condition, and (4) research that cannot be approved in the first three 
categories but that is approved by a special panel convened by the Secretary of the 
Department of Health and Human Services.27 The first three categories of research are to 
be approved by Institutional Review Boards (IRBs).28 The least controversial categories 
are research that offers a prospect of direct benefit that outweighs the risks, which is 
sometimes referred to as “therapeutic” research,29 and minimal risk research that offers 
no prospect of direct benefit.30 The importance of research in these first two categories is 
widely, though not completely, recognized.31
This Article will focus on the more controversial categories of research that pose 
net risk to children. For instance, the third category of research permitted under the U.S. 
federal regulations is non-beneficial research that poses a minor increase over minimal 
risk.32 The regulations require that this slightly riskier category of research be justified 
only when it offers benefit to other children in the future who suffer from the condition 
being studied in the research.33 Finally, the fourth category of research is a catch-all 
category of not otherwise approvable research that can only be approved by a special 
panel.34 The regulations do not specify a limit on the risks that this category of research 
                                                          
23 Ethical Conduct of Clinical Research Involving Children, COMMITTEE ON CLINICAL RESEARCH 
INVOLVING CHILDREN, INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACAD. 40 (Marilyn J. Field & Richard E. Behrman 
eds., 2004).
24 Id. at 43.
25 NAT'L COMM'N FOR THE PROT. OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH,
RESEARCH INVOLVING CHILDREN: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 1 (1977).
26 Douglas S. Diekema, Conducting Ethical Research in Pediatrics: A Brief Historical Overview and 
Review of Pediatric Regulations, 149 J. PEDIATR. 1, S3, S5 (2006). 
27 45 C.F.R. § 46.401–46.409 (1983). 
28 Id.
29 See id. § 46.405.
30 See id. § 46.404.
31 See Deborah Weimar, Beyond Parens Patriae: Assuring Timely, Informed, Compassionate Decision 
Making for HIV-Positive Children in Foster Care, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 379, 379– 80 (1991) (describing a 
case where a child in foster care in need of treatment that was only being provided in research experienced 
legal barriers in enrolling in the study). 
32 45 C.F.R. § 46.406 (1983).
33 Id.
34 See id. § 46.407.
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can involve.35 This category of research could therefore include research that poses 
relatively high risks and no prospect of direct benefit. Although these regulations have 
been in place for almost thirty years, non-beneficial research remains very 
controversial.36
Notwithstanding the persistence of some controversy over pediatric research, the 
government has done a great deal in recent years to incentivize research in children. 
Making pediatric research legally permissible was not enough to ensure that pediatric 
research would be conducted as needed. Realizing this, the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) began a program in 1994 to encourage more pediatric research, 
but had limited success.37 Congress acted in 1996 by adding an economic incentive for 
conducting pediatric research. Under the Pediatric Exclusivity Provision of the U.S. FDA 
Modernization Act, Congress gave sponsors of research six additional months of patent 
life if they performed pediatric studies requested by the FDA.38 When this act was set to 
expire in 2002, Congress passed the Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act, which 
continued the provision of pediatric exclusivity for conducting research specified by the 
FDA.39 Some have argued that encouraging the conduct of pediatric research is not 
enough without attending to the need to publish the results.40 Nevertheless, the need for 
pediatric research has been made even clearer by the research that has been disseminated 
as a result of these incentives.41
A. Critiques of pediatric research for violating the best interests standard
Even though the importance of pediatric research is now widely recognized, many 
scholars and commentators have questioned whether pediatric research can be legally or 
ethically justified. Shortly before ascending to Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, 
Warren Burger published an article arguing that “no rational social order will or should 
tolerate” pediatric research that does not offer net benefits to children.42 Paul Ramsey 
forcefully argued that individuals should only be subjected to risk in research if they have 
given consent. Because children cannot give their own consent, he maintained that 
pediatric research that poses net risks could not be justified.43 These arguments have 
found their way into the limited case law addressing research with children.
1. Cases
Only two state courts appear to have addressed the issue of when children can be 
enrolled into research. The paucity of cases can in part be explained by the fact that it is 
                                                          
35 See id. § 46.407.
36 WENDLER, supra note 14, at 31–32.
37 See 21 C.F.R. § 201.57 (2002).
38 Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105–115, 111 Stat. 2296 (1997).
39 Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act, Pub. L. No. 107–09, 115 Stat. 1408 (2002).
40 Daniel K. Benjamin, Jr., et al., Safety and Transparency of Pediatric Drug Trials, 163 ARCH PEDIATR.
ADOLESCENT MED. 1080, 1082 (2009).
41 Id.
42 Warren E. Burger, Reflections on Law and Experimental Medicine, 15 UCLA L. REV. 436, 438 (1968).
43 Paul Ramsey, The Enforcement of Morals: Nontherapeutic Research on Children, 6 HASTINGS CENTER 
REPORT 4, 21–30 (1976); Paul Ramsey, Children as Research Subjects: A Reply, 7 HASTINGS CENTER 
REPORT 2, 40–42 (1977).
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hard to imagine who would have both standing and the desire to bring suit. In 1973, 
James Nielsen, who served on the University of California at San Francisco’s (UCSF) 
Committee on Human Experimentation brought suit against UCSF, objecting to a 
proposed pediatric study by arguing that parents and guardians lacked legal authority to 
consent to expose their children to risks.44 The suit was dismissed for a lack of standing.45
Parents or children are likely to be the only parties who might have standing to sue if a 
child participates in pediatric research, and it is not likely that they will often have the 
desire to bring suit. Only in rare circumstances would a parent consent to his or her 
child’s involvement in a research study and subsequently bring suit against the 
researchers and sponsors, and children rarely bring suit against their parents’ will. Of the 
courts that have addressed the legal permissibility of pediatric research, one court 
considered the welfare of the research subjects as the primary concern, and the other 
attempted to determine when to permit medical research by applying the best interests 
standard.46
The first case to address whether pediatric research is legally permissible was T.D. 
v. N.Y. State Office of Mental Health. Although both of the cases discussed herein 
appeared to prioritize the welfare of individual research subjects above all else, the court 
in T.D. did recognize that the state has important interests in conducting research. In 
particular, the court explained that the state has important policy reasons “to conduct 
research and to develop programs which further prevention and early detection of mental 
illness.”47 Thus, it appeared that the fundamental issue at stake in the case was balancing 
the societal benefit from medical research against the risks to subjects who cannot give 
their own consent.48 The court determined that the New York state regulations in question 
were overbroad and exceeded the authority of the agency (but explicitly chose not to 
address the federal regulations), and limited its holding to non-beneficial research that 
poses greater than minimal risk.49
                                                          
44 Nielsen v. Regents of the University of California et al., No. 665–049, Civ. 8–9 (Super. Ct. Cal. Aug. 23, 
1973).
45 WENDLER, supra note 14, at 44.
46 See T.D. v. N.Y. State Office of Mental Health, 228 A.D.2d 95 (1996);  Compare Grimes , 782 A.2d at 
853 (“We have long stressed that the ‘best interests of the child’ is the overriding concern of this Court in 
matters relating to children.”).
47 T.D., 228 A.D.2d at 101 (citing New York Mental Hygiene Law § 7.01).
48 Id. at 100. Notably, some provisions of these regulations made them unique and less protective of 
subjects than the U.S. federal regulations and many international guidelines.  For instance, if no parent or 
legal guardian is available to consent for the child, the regulations provide that consent may be obtained 
from an adult family member who is involved in making treatment decisions for the child. See id. at 123 
(“We also find unacceptable the provisions that allow for consent to be obtained on behalf of minors for 
participation in greater than minimal risk nontherapeutic research from the minor’s parent or legal 
guardian, or, where no parent or guardian is available, from an adult family member involved in making 
treatment decisions for the child.”). The U.S. federal regulations have strict provisions for when a child can 
be involved in research if no parent or guardian is available to provide consent. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.408(d) 
(2011) (requirements for permission by parents or guardians and for assent by children); 45 C.F.R. § 
46.409 (2011). 
49 T.D., 228 A.D.2d at 123–124.
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The second court to rule on pediatric research viewed it more harshly in the case of 
Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Institute.50 In this case, the Kennedy Krieger Institute, a 
research institute associated with Johns Hopkins, conducted a non-therapeutic research 
program testing the effectiveness of varying degrees of lead paint abatement in housing 
inhabited by young children.51 The Maryland Court of Appeals decided that non-
beneficial research involving children should not be permitted when it fails to meet the 
best interests standard.52 This ruling was widely criticized and seemed to suggest that the 
federal regulations governing research with children conflicted with the laws governing 
children.53 This had the potential to shut down a great deal of research.
The Maryland high court was concerned about the behavior of the researchers in 
inducing parents with young children to live in conditions that could be harmful to those 
children:
[I]n our view, parents, whether improperly enticed by trinkets, food 
stamps, money or other items, have no more right to intentionally and 
unnecessarily place children in potentially hazardous nontherapeutic 
research surroundings, than do researchers. In such cases, parental 
consent, no matter how informed, is insufficient.54
The Kennedy Krieger Institute was testing different levels of removal of lead paint in a 
research study. The study “required certain classes of homes to have only partial lead 
paint abatement modifications performed . . . [and] encouraged, and in at least one of the 
cases required, the landlords to rent the premises to families with young children.”55
Although the court did not think that the parents were responsible for the harm 
because they had failed to give informed consent,56 the court reasoned that these parents 
did not have the authority to enroll their children in non-beneficial research that poses 
risks.57 Interestingly, however, some commentators have noted that the pediatric research 
subjects in Grimes were better off than they would have been otherwise as a result of 
their participation in the research because approximately 95% of the homes in the areas 
where they lived contained hazardous levels of lead.58
                                                          
50 Grimes, 782 A.2d at 807.
51 Id. at 811–812.
52 Id. at 858.
53 See Diane E. Hoffmann & Karen H. Rothenberg, Whose Duty is it Anyway?: The Kennedy Krieger 
Opinion and its Implications for Public Health Research, 6 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 109, 109–10 
(2002); see also Doriane Lambert Coleman, The Legal Ethics of Pediatric Research, 57 DUKE L.J. 517, 575 
(2007).
54 Grimes, 782 A.2d at 814.
55 Id. at 811–812.
56 Id. at 849 (explaining that the “consent forms did not directly inform the parents that it was possible, 
even contemplated, that some level of lead, a harmful substance depending upon accumulation, might 
contaminate the blood of the children.”).
57 Id. at 852 (“What right does a parent have to knowingly expose a child not in need of therapy to health 
risks or otherwise knowingly place a child in danger, even if it can be argued it is for the greater good?”).
58 Anna C. Mastroianni & Jeffrey P. Kahn, Risk and Responsibility: Ethics, Grimes v Kennedy Krieger, and 
Public Health Research Involving Children, 92 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1073, 1075 (2002).
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The Grimes court chose not to rule that the federal regulations were an unlawful 
extension of parental authority, primarily by taking pains to determine that the research 
was not consistent with the federal regulations.59 Yet, the court had harsh words for many 
of the protections surrounding research. For instance, it called IRBs “in-house organs”60
and said they were not sufficiently independent to protect the interests of children.61 The 
court assumed that the best interests standard was the correct standard for judging 
research and concluded that parental and societal interests cannot overcome the concern 
for the particular child.62 The court stated, “It is, simply, and we hope, succinctly put, not 
in the best interest of any healthy child to be intentionally put in a non-therapeutic 
situation where his or her health may be impaired, in order to test methods that may 
ultimately benefit all children.”63
The court was correct that non-beneficial research that poses some degree of risk 
cannot be shoehorned into the best interests standard. The more important question the 
court failed to grapple with sufficiently was whether the best interests standard is the 
right standard to apply in the context of non-beneficial pediatric research. 
The opinion did acknowledge that there are cases in which parents were allowed to 
consent to procedures even though the child’s best interests were not the most important 
factor in the decision. Specifically, the court examined cases where parents consent for 
their children to serve as organ donors for other family members.64 The court attempted 
to distinguish these cases in two ways. First, it noted that the parents or guardians 
involved obtained prior court approval before proceeding with the donations.65 Second, it 
explained that the procedure was therapeutic for at least one of the children involved.66
Both of these arguments are flawed for several reasons. The argument that pediatric 
research is something parents can consent to without prior oversight mischaracterizes 
both research and the process of live organ donation. The Grimes study was approved by 
an IRB, which has regulatory authority to approve research. IRBs oversee all federally 
funded research and have the authority to disapprove research.67 Therefore, it is not the 
case that parents can merely consent to whatever studies research sponsors choose to 
make available. Second, some parents make decisions about sibling donations without 
obtaining prior approval from a court,68 and many more would be likely to do so since the 
                                                          
59 Grimes, 782 A.2d at 860 (“The research did not comply with the regulations. There clearly was more 
than a minimal risk involved. Under the regulations, children should not have been used for the purpose of 
measuring how much lead they would accumulate in their blood while living in partially abated houses to 
which they were recruited initially or encouraged to remain, because of the study.”). 
60 Id. at 817.
61 Id. at 860.
62 Id. at 853 (“this Court’s concern for the particular child and particular case, over-arches all other 
interests.”); see also id. at 858 (“We hold that in Maryland a parent, appropriate relative, or other applicable 
surrogate, cannot consent to the participation of a child or other person under legal disability in non-
therapeutic research or studies in which there is any risk of injury or damage to the health of the subject.”).
63 Id. at 853.
64 Id. at 853–854.
65 Id. at 855.
66 Id.
67 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.103, 109 (2011).
68 Curran v. Bosze, 566 N.E.2d 1319, 1342 (Ill. 1990) (three of the witnesses testifying in this case were 
parents who had made the decision for one child to donate an organ to a sibling, and it is clear in at least 
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law has become fairly settled that parents have the authority to consent for live organ or 
tissue donation. Third, one of the cases the court cites is not about a parent consenting for 
a child to donate to a sibling, but for a child to donate to a cousin.69 This is not a direct 
conflict of interest for a parent who has the same duty to both children, and does not seem 
to be justified as the only way a parent can fulfill his or her duty to one of his or her 
children. Finally, the fact that a sibling donation is therapeutic for one child does not 
eliminate the conflict of interest faced by a parent in making the decision. Although the 
court determined that IRBs face significant conflicts of interest and are therefore not 
sufficiently independent to evaluate research, it was completely untroubled by the 
conflict of interest that a parent faces when deciding whether one child should donate an 
organ or tissue to another. 
After Grimes was decided, commentators were concerned about its implications for 
the federal regulations.70 In particular, although the court did not attempt to challenge the 
federal regulations themselves, and it is unclear that the court would have had authority 
to do so, its ruling appeared to forbid any non-beneficial research that poses risk, which 
would imply that research that is approvable under the federal regulations could not be 
conducted in Maryland. The Kennedy Krieger Institute filed a motion of reconsideration 
that the court denied. Nevertheless, the court took this decision as an opportunity to 
clarify its previous opinion and indicated the following: 
As we think is clear . . . by ‘any risk,’ we meant any articulable risk 
beyond the minimal kind of risk that is inherent in any endeavor. The 
context of the statement was a non-therapeutic study that promises no 
medical benefit to the child whatever, so that any balance between risk 
and benefit is necessarily negative.71
Unfortunately, this clarification did not help resolve the question of whether non-
beneficial research that poses more than minimal risk might be acceptable. Furthermore, 
it still fails to acknowledge the complexity of the law governing the decisions that parents 
can make for children that do not benefit them. This case has been subjected to a great 
deal of criticism and its holding has not been followed by any other court.72 Legal 
                                                                                                                                                                            
one case that the mother did not obtain prior court approval first—she stated that “[n]o one questioned her 
right to make that decision.”).
69 Grimes, 782 A.2d at 854 (citing Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121 (1941)).
70 There is a paucity of case law on what research risks children can be exposed to for the benefit of others. 
One barrier to further legal treatment about children’s participation in research is who would have standing 
to bring lawsuits to settle the open questions. The plaintiffs in Grimes were parents who initially provided 
consent for their children’s participation in research. If anyone other than the parents were to sue, it may be 
difficult to establish standing and a right to interfere with parental authority to consent for children to 
engage in various activities. This suggests that future cases can only be brought in particular ways: (1) if 
parents claim they did not provide adequately informed consent; (2) if one parent sues for what another has 
agreed to; or (3) if prosecutors bring a case against a particular research study (in which case, they may also 
decide to sue the parents for agreeing to research participation).
71 Grimes, 782 A.2d at 862.
72 Cases that have cited and followed its analysis have done so in regard to procedural points about the 
standard of proof, summary judgment, or negligence. See, e.g., Shastri Narayan Swaroop, Inc. v. Hart, 854 
A.2d 269, 273 (Md. App. 2004); Ross v. Am. Iron Works, 834 A.2d 962, 967 (Md. App. 2003); Sadler v. 
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commentators have argued that the Grimes decision has the potential to shut down a great 
deal of valuable research, and inappropriately holds researchers responsible for risks that 
may be unrelated to research.73 Thus, the persuasive ability and legal force of Grimes is 
still somewhat unclear, but seems of limited value.
2. Commentators
Following Grimes, a number of commentators have attempted to determine 
whether non-beneficial research with children is legally permissible. Some have argued 
that non-beneficial research is in the best interests of children. Others have concluded that 
non-beneficial research is not in a child’s best interests, and that parents therefore do not 
have the authority to enroll their children in research. All of these commentators have 
assumed that parents can only consent to what is in their child’s best interests.74
Karen Thiel argues that in deciding that research with children had to follow the 
best interests standard, “Grimes followed the common law rule that parents may be 
authorized to promote the best interests of their own children, but not children in 
general.”75 Thiel concludes that it is unclear from the Grimes ruling whether minimal risk 
research would be permitted under the best interests standard.76
Doriane Coleman contends that parents are given authority to consent for their 
children “because they are the most likely to make decisions in their children’s best 
interests.”77 She agrees with the court in Grimes in many respects, stating: “the court was 
correct that the law of parents’ consent authority (as it is defined by child protection law) 
                                                                                                                                                                            
Dimensions Healthcare Corp., 836 A.2d 655, 669 (Md. 2003); Dehn v. Edgecombe, 834 A.2d 146, 158 
(Md. App. 2003); Sterling v. Johns Hopkins Hosp., 802 A.2d 440, 444 (Md. App. 2002); Muthukumarana 
v. Montgomery County, 805 A.2d 372, 389 (Md. 2002); Megonnell v. United States Auto. Ass'n, 796 A.2d 
758, 763 (Md. 2002); Md. Dep't of the Env't v. Underwood, 792 A.2d 1130, 1136 (Md. 2002); Coleman v. 
Anne Arundel County Police Dep't, 797 A.2d 770, 780 (Md. 2002). Four cases that involved questions 
about research have distinguished Grimes or used it as a reference for a factual point about the Nuremberg 
Code. See Abney v. Amgen, Inc., 443 F.3d 540, 550 (6th Cir. 2006) (finding dissimilarities between the 
facts of the case before it and Grimes); Suthers v. Amgen Inc., 441 F.Supp.2d 478, 487 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) 
(distinguishing Grimes); Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16126, at *31–32 (S.D.N.Y. 
Aug. 9, 2005) (citing Grimes for the fact that “the United States has not ratified or adopted the Nuremberg 
Code.”); Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hosp. Research Inst., Inc., 264 F.Supp.2d 1064, 1069 (S.D.Fla. 
2003) (citing Grimes and describing the law regarding a duty of informed consent for research subjects as 
“unsettled.”). 
73 Diane E. Hoffmann & Karen H. Rothenberg, Whose Duty is it Anyway?: The Kennedy Krieger Opinion 
and its Implications for Public Health Research, 6 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 109, 109–111, 131 (2002).
74 Importantly, some commentators have acknowledged that the interests of others in the family should be 
allowed to trump the best interests of an individual child, but few, if any, have clearly argued that the best 
interests standard itself should be questioned for this reason, in order to accommodate others’ interests 
more generally, and for public health considerations as I do here. See, e.g., Paul Litton, Non-Beneficial 
Pediatric Research and the Best Interests Standard: A Legal and Ethical Reconciliation, 8 YALE J. HEALTH 
POL’Y L. & ETHICS 359, 390 (2008); Lainie Friedman Ross, Health Care Decisionmaking by Children: Is it 
in their best interest?, 27 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 41, 41 (1997). 
75 Karen Smith Thiel, Research with Children: The New Legal and Policy Landscape: Note: Parental 
Consent for Children’s Participation in Biomedical Research: The Ethical, Regulatory, and Judicial 
Framework of Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Institute, Inc., 6 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 169, 191 (2002).
76 Id. at 192–193.
77 Doriane Lambert Coleman, supra note 53, at 548.
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concerns itself exclusively with the best interests of ‘the particular child in the particular 
case.’”78 Coleman argues on this basis that the legal framework for pediatric research 
needs to be completely overhauled to reconcile it with the best interests standard and 
child custody law.79
Efi Rubenstein similarly takes the best interests standard to be the correct standard 
for evaluating pediatric research, and therefore contends that non-beneficial research 
should be limited and only allowed when a child advocate decides to enroll a child in 
research.80 Rubenstein argues, “In the United States, federal regulations for 
nontherapeutic research with children require parental permission for child participation 
in nearly all research activities. This requirement is rooted in the assumption that parents 
will always act in the best interests of their children. . . . [T]his assumption is invalid and 
exposes children to unnecessary risks.”81 Rubenstein proposes that a child advocacy 
program should be created where an independent advocate has to decide whether a 
particular child can enroll in a research study—not that child’s parents and not 
Institutional Review Boards—in order to eliminate possible conflicts of interest.82
On the other hand, some commentators assume a stringent version of the best 
interests standard should apply to research, but that the best interests standard would still 
permit research that poses net risks to children. For instance, David Smolin seems to 
argue that research can be justified under the best interests standard as a general rule. He 
does, however, acknowledge that the best interests standard is a problem for research that 
poses risks: 
Parental authority to subject children to situations and acts that are 
significantly harmful and indisputably contrary to the child’s self interests 
may have existed in prior historical eras, but seems unlikely to have 
survived contemporary emphasis on the child’s best interests. Although it 
could be argued that sacrifice for the sake of others is virtuous and thus 
good for the child, contemporary courts would generally be inclined to 
view significant risk-taking for others as clearly contrary to the child’s 
best interest, and therefore beyond parental authority. 
Smolin concludes that we are in a state of legal uncertainty about the status of research 
with children, and that we could remain in this state indefinitely so long as other state 
courts do not follow the lead of the Grimes court. 
Loretta Kopelman argues that the best interests standard is less stringent than is 
often assumed, and that under this standard, “[t]he best interest of the child standard does 
not mandate that one always do what is literally best or ideal for the child. That would be 
an impossible duty for parents or investigators. Rather, it requires that some reasonable or 
                                                          
78 Id. at 584.
79 Id. at 610–11.
80 Efi Rubenstein, Comment, Going Beyond Parents and Institutional Review Boards in Protecting 
Children Involved in Nontherapeutic Research, 33 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 251, 290 (2003).
81 Id. at 252.
82 Id. at 290.
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minimal threshold duty of care must be met.”83 She further explains that “[t]he goal of 
many research rules for children, such as the U.S. regulations, is to balance the best 
interests of children as a group in having needed research conducted with the best 
interests of potential subjects.”84 Arguing that the best interpretation of the best interests 
standard is a “standard for reasonableness” that takes into account the interests of others, 
Kopelman contends that this version of the best interests standard can easily 
accommodate non-beneficial research.85 It is not clear from Kopelman’s analysis, 
however, whether courts actually use the best interests standard as a “standard for 
reasonableness.” Furthermore, as shown in Part III infra, there is empirical evidence that 
courts routinely apply the best interests as paramount standard, rather than the 
interpretation Kopelman proposes.
Paul Litton proposes to reconcile research and the best interests standard in a novel 
and interesting way. He contends that it is in the best interests of each individual child to 
participate in low-risk, non-beneficial research, because the alternative is just as or more 
risky. He argues that the “slight risks” of being in this kind of research “would be 
transferred to medical care if non-beneficial pediatric research were prohibited 
altogether.”86 Litton appears to make this argument both to provide an ethical 
justification for pediatric research and also as guidance for courts, legislators, and 
regulators applying the best interests standard to determine whether individual children 
can participate in research.87
As an ethical justification for pediatric research that poses net risks to children, 
Litton acknowledges that his argument rests on an empirical claim.88 Though this claim 
may be correct, there are some important caveats. First, there are some children who are 
relatively healthy throughout childhood and who only suffer from illnesses that are not 
difficult to treat with existing knowledge. Participating in research exposes those children 
to risks that are greater than they would experience otherwise. There is reason to believe 
that it may not be in the best interests of an individual child to be enrolled in research that 
is not for his or her direct benefit. Although most children might be worse off if non-
beneficial research were not permitted, it does not follow that any particular child will be 
at all better off if he or she is permitted to participate in research. It would always be 
better for that child if some other child ran the risk of research participation. Additionally, 
some healthy children are exposed to a (likely very small) risk of death from participation 
in a research study. Although there it may be true ex ante that the child’s risk of 
participation in a research trial is similar to the risk of being treated for some future 
                                                          
83 Loretta M. Kopelman, Pediatric Research Regulations Under Legal Scrutiny: Grimes Narrows Their 
Interpretation, 30 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 38, 48 n.18 (2002).
84 Loretta M. Kopelman, Children and Bioethics: Uses and Abuses of the Best-Interests Standard, 22 J.
MED. & PHIL. 213, 214 (1997).
85 Id. at 216. 
86 Paul Litton, Non-Beneficial Pediatric Research and the Best Interests Standard: A Legal and Ethical 
Reconciliation, 8 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 359, 409–10 (2008).
87 Id. at 366 (“[I]n thinking about the best interests of each child, a court (or legislator or regulator) must 
also consider that from the perspective of each child (including each child enrolled in non-beneficial 
research), it is in her best interests for the state to permit such research where there is an appropriately low 
ceiling on the acceptable level of risk.”).
88 Id. at 367.
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disease the child might contract without a solid evidence base, this argument would be 
difficult to make after a child has died. Nevertheless, to the extent that Litton’s account is 
aimed at providing an ethical justification for the policy of permitting pediatric research, 
his work makes a valuable contribution, though one that differs from the aim of this 
Article.
Litton may also intend to provide guidance to courts about how to apply the best 
interests standard to pediatric research, which is the aim of this Article. The empirical 
analysis in Part III, infra, suggests that adding a new version of the best interests standard 
is unlikely to help clarify the confusion that characterizes courts’ decision making. 
Additionally, though Litton’s argument helps illustrate why the policy of pediatric 
research is justified, it seems to provide limited guidance to courts in particular cases 
when they have to decide whether a parent is justified in exposing their child to a certain 
amount of risk. 
In sum, from the perspective of the best interests of the child alone, research that 
poses net risks is impermissible. However, the assumption made by many courts and 
commentators that the child’s best interests should take precedence over all other 
interests is flawed. Looking at the historical development of the best interests standard 
will reveal that this narrow interpretation is not the only way to understand the best 
interests standard, and that the interests of others have been taken into account almost 
since the inception of the standard. 
II. THE BEST INTERESTS STANDARD
A. Historical development of the best interests standard
The historical development of the best interests standard can be traced back to early 
English law. From the end of the thirteenth century, the English sovereign exercised a 
type of wardship over “natural fools and idiots” to protect them; this power was vested in 
the courts in 1540.89 This exercise of protection over adults who lacked the mental 
capacity to protect themselves seems to have been the origin of the parens patriae 
doctrine and ultimately led to the ability of the state to regulate the treatment of 
children.90 Nevertheless, in feudal England, the law considered children to be the 
property of their fathers, and the “father had the supreme right to the guardianship of his 
infant heirs” just as he did over his property.91 Child labor was an important economic 
                                                          
89 Lawrence B. Custer, The Origins of the Doctrine of Parens Patriae, 27 EMORY L. J. 195, 195–96 (1978); 
see also 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *463 (“For the lord chancellor is, by right derived from 
the crown, the general and supreme guardian of all infants, as well as idiots and lunatics; that is, of all such 
persons as have not discretion enough to manage their own concerns. In case therefore any guardian abuses 
his trust, the court will check and punish him; nay, sometimes will proceed to the removal of him, and 
appoint another in his stead.”).
90 Custer, supra note 89, at 196; see also Daniel B. Griffith, The Best Interests Standard: A Comparison of 
the State’s Parens Patriae Authority and Judicial Oversight in Best Interests Determinations for Children 
and Incompetent Patients, 7 ISSUES L. & MED. 283, 287 (1991–92).
91 Sarah Abramowicz, English Child Custody Law, 1660–1839: The Origins of Judicial Intervention in 
Paternal Custody, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1344, 1366 (1999); see also 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES*453 (“The legal power of a father—for a mother, as such, is entitled to no power, but only 
to reverence and respect; the power of a father, I say, over the persons of his children ceases at the age of 
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asset for the family. For these reasons, courts generally did not interfere with a father’s 
decisions about the guardianship of his property or his children. 
Courts gradually gained increasing jurisdiction over decisions involving children. 
The idea that the king should serve as a father protecting all of his people was suggested 
in the scholarly literature in the mid 1500s, and in 1610, James I spoke before Parliament 
and referred to himself as “parens patriae, the political father of his people.”92
Courts first began overseeing some decisions involving children directly with the 
passage of the Tenure Abolition Act in 1660, which did away with traditional forms of 
assigning guardianship, and granted fathers the right to appoint guardians for their 
children (either while the father was still alive or after his death).93 Guardians had 
authority over marriage, education, and the religious upbringing of the ward, but the 
Court of Chancery had power over guardians.94 Once courts were in the business of 
overseeing guardians, questions arose about what to do if a father died without appointing 
a guardian, or if a guardian became incapacitated during the child’s life. The Court of 
Chancery was given the power to appoint guardians in such cases and to resolve disputes 
between guardians and children.95 The basis for review of a guardian’s decision was a 
nascent version of the best interests standard: the decision was judged based on whether it 
was “for the benefit of the infant.”96 At the time, this typically meant that the court made 
decisions to ensure the child could obtain increased fortune and rank, or because one 
course of action was considered more “proper” than another.97 Yet a different standard 
was used in cases involving children who would eventually become members of the 
House of Lords. In these cases, courts’ decisions were determined by the interests of the 
general public.98 Thus, even from the early origins of the best interests standard, the 
interests of other parties and the public was a part of judicial decision making.
Although the tradition of fathers having absolute rights over their children was not 
immediately threatened by court jurisdiction over guardians,99 the ability to regulate 
                                                                                                                                                                            
twenty-one: for they are then enfranchised by arriving at years of discretion, or that point which the law has 
established, as some must necessarily be established, when the empire of the father, or other guardian, 
gives place to the empire of reason. Yet, till that age arrives, this empire of the father continues even after 
his death; for he may by his will appoint a guardian to his children.”).
92 Custer, supra note 89, at 201 (citing W. STAUNFORD, AN EXPOSICION OF THE KINGES PREROGATIVE 37 
(London 1567); P. HUGHES & R. FRIES, CROWN AND PARLIAMENT IN TUDOR-STUART ENGLAND 167 
(1959).
93 Abramowicz, supra note 91, at 1369. Fathers could appoint anyone as a guardian as long as the man was 
a property owner and was not Catholic.
94 Id. at 1372–76.
95 Id. at 1370.
96 Id. at 1378–79. The Court of Chancery’s earliest assertions of its parens patriae power over infants may 
have been consistent with the spirit of earlier legal decisions, but was likely to have arisen from a 
typographical error. See also, Custer, supra note 89, at 202–04.
97 Abramowicz, supra note 91, at 1379.
98 Id. at 1379–80.
99 MARY ANN MASON, FROM FATHER’S PROPERTY TO CHILDREN’S RIGHTS 46 (1994) (“The mutual 
obligations of a master-servant relationship, rather than a parent-child relationship in the modern sense, 
best describes the legally enforceable bonds between the adult, who held custody and control over the 
child, and the child, who held rights similar to those of an employee.”).
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guardians paved the way for courts to regulate fathers.100 In the 1756 case Butler v. 
Freeman, a child whose father was still living but had appointed a guardian was seduced 
away from the guardian.101 The seducer tried to raise the defense that because the father 
was still alive, any enforcement of the guardian’s wishes by the court would be an 
improper interference with the father’s rights.102 The court denied the legal distinction 
between testamentary guardians and fathers, proclaiming that the law treated the two 
equally.103
Two days after Butler was decided, Blake v. Leigh took this logic a step forward. 
There, the court found that fathers could waive their rights over their children and thereby 
relinquish their control over them.104 In that case, a father was found to have waived his 
paternal rights by accepting an inheritance from the grandfather because a condition of 
the inheritance was that a guardian other than the father be appointed for the child.105 The 
interests of the child were found to trump the interests of the father. 
Courts also began to allow exceptions to recognize that the interests of children 
might sometimes require that their mothers retained custody over them. In Blisset’s Case, 
decided in 1774, Lord Mansfield considered the rights of a father who was bankrupt, had 
not contributed to his family, and had committed adultery.106 Lord Mansfield granted 
custody to the mother and explained that “if the parties are disagreed, the court will do 
what shall appear best for the child.”107 This was the first clear indication that the best 
interests of a child could take precedence over a father’s rights, but more dramatic 
changes to the law did not occur for years to come.
In Powel v. Cleaver, decided in 1789, a father was found to forfeit his rights over 
his children when he refused a legacy for his child that would require transferring 
parental authority to a guardian.108 The idea was that denying one’s child access to wealth 
was a breach of paternal duty.109 Powel brought about significant change in the law. 
Powel’s holding was explained by a later case that noted that the Powel court’s exercise 
of jurisdiction was based on the duty “which upon a tender, just, and legitimate 
deliberation the parent owed to the true interests of the child . . . .”110 Additionally, Powel
was cited to support several other decisions where a court took away a father’s parental 
rights where the father was bankrupt and the child had a sizeable inheritance.111 These 
cases demonstrate an increasing willingness by courts to intervene to protect a child’s 
interests. They also show that in the late 1700s, a child’s best interests were thought to be 
served by the acquisition of wealth.
                                                          
100 Abramowicz, supra note 91, at 1381.
101 Id. at 1382 (citing 27 Eng. Rep. 204 (Ch. 1756)).
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Id. at 1383 (citing 27 Eng. Rep. 1009 (Ch. 1732)).
105 Id.
106 Blisset’s Case, 1 Lofft 748, 98 Eng. Rep. 899 (K.B., 1774).
107 Griffith, supra note 90, at 292 (citing Blisset’s Case, 1 Lofft 748 (Mansfield, C.J.)). 
108 Abramowicz, supra note 91, at 1384.
109 Id. at 1385 (quoting Powel, 29 Eng. Rep.  274  (Ch.  1789) (“[T]he Court will take care that the child 
shall be properly educated for his expectations.”)).
110 Id. at 1385 (quoting R. v. De Manneville, 5 East 221 (1804)).
111 Id.
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Two subsequent decisions significantly expanded the English Court of Chancery’s 
jurisdiction over and ability to interfere with the traditional rights given to fathers. In De 
Manneville, a French father and a British mother were entangled in a custody battle, and 
the court decided the case by saying it would “do what is for the benefit of the infant, 
without regard to the prayer.”112 The court, clearly feeling ambivalent about its role,113
weighed the relevant considerations and decided that the father would retain custody but 
would have to raise the child in England.114 In another case, a father who had committed 
adultery with a married woman had breached the duty granted to him as a father, and the 
Court explained its role as a very active one—it noted that fatherhood is a trust that courts 
oversee.115
The presumption that the father was automatically the custodial parent was finally 
eliminated in 1817, when the “Rule in Shelley’s case” was adopted. This rule explicitly 
allowed courts to choose which parent was more fit to be a parent.116 England began to 
formally recognize the importance of maternal rights in 1839, with the passage of the 
Custody of Infants Act that granted mothers rights over children for custody or for 
visitation.117 Thus, English common law set the stage for American judges to recognize 
the best interests of children as well as the rights of mothers.
There is some debate about when the best interests standard was first used in the 
United States. The earliest published decision which defied the traditional focus on a 
father’s rights appears to be Prather v. Prather, which was decided in 1809. In that case, 
the father forced his wife, the child’s mother, to leave their home and he then began 
living with another woman. A South Carolina judge was clearly troubled by the father’s 
actions and chose to award custody to the mother.118 Another very early case that invoked 
the best interests of the child was Commonwealth v. Addicks, decided in 1813.119 In this 
case, the mother had committed adultery; at that time, the mother’s actions would usually 
have been grounds for granting custody to the father. Nevertheless, the court focused on 
the needs of the children and chose to award custody to the mother:
It is to [the children], that our anxiety is principally directed; and it appears 
to us, that considering their tender age, they stand in need of that kind of 
assistance, which can be afforded by none so well as a mother. It is on their 
account, therefore, that exercising the discretion with which the law has 
invested us, we think it best, at present, not to take them from her.120
                                                          
112 Id. at 1387 (quoting De Manneville, 5 East 221).
113 Id. (“In the situation of this child it is extremely difficult not to interpose; and it is also extremely 
difficult to say, how the Court is to interpose.”).
114 Id.
115 Id. at 1388–90.
116 Shelley v. Westbrooke, 37 Eng Rep. 850 (Ch. 1817).
117 See Robert C. Brown, The Custody of Children, 2 IND. L.J. 325, 325 n.3 (1927) (citing 2 & 3 Vict. c. 54 
(Talfourd’s Act)).
118 MASON, supra note 99, at 60 (citing Prather v. Prather, 4 SC Eq. (4 Des.) 33 (1809)). 
119  Commonwealth v. Addicks, 5 Binn. 520 (Pa. 1813).
120 Id. at 521–22.
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Notably, the shift in legal focus to the best interests of the child did not immediately lead 
to a best interests standard. In Commonwealth v. Addicks, the court was focused on the 
child’s interests. Nevertheless, it based its decision not entirely on what was in the 
interests of the individual children in front of them, but on a proxy for the child’s best 
interests—the principle that young children, especially females, do best with their 
mothers. Moreover, the degree of change was not uniform across the country, and some 
courts still placed utmost importance on a father’s natural right to custody up until the 
beginning of the twentieth century.121
When courts began to consider a child’s interests more routinely, this led to a proxy 
of promoting the best interests of young children under the tender years doctrine.122 The 
tender years doctrine was a presumption that the mother should retain custody of young 
children.123 As Mary Ann Mason describes it:
The colonial view of children as helping hands in a labor-scarce economy 
gave way to a romantic, emotional view of children, who were no longer 
legally akin to servants, under the complete control of their fathers or 
masters, but instead deemed to have interests of their own. Increasingly, 
these interests became identified with the nurturing mother.124
This presumption could be overridden upon a showing that the mother was unfit to raise 
the child, which was often accomplished by demonstrating that she had committed 
adultery or left the father without “just cause.”125
Considering a child’s welfare became more central to and more directly a part of 
legal decision making in 1886. At that time, the Guardianship of Infants Act was passed 
and required judges to consider a child’s welfare when deciding the outcome of custody 
disputes.126 Courts and legislatures began to focus on the best interests of the child in a 
manner independent of the tender years doctrine. 
Perhaps the earliest reported case that used the best interests standard to judge a 
parent’s medical decision making was Heinemann’s Appeal, a case decided by the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in 1880.127 This case involved a father with five children.128
The father did not support his children financially—they were “supported out of their 
own estates.”129 When the children and their mother became ill with diphtheria, the father 
treated them himself by administering something called the Bannscheidt system, which 
involved pricking the patient’s skin on different parts of the body with a instrument that 
                                                          
121 MASON, supra note 99, at 50.
122 Id. at 61.
123 See id. at 53 (noting a shift among the judiciary during the nineteenth century in which “[j]udges . . . 
gave custody to [mothers] based on the growing judicial view that placing children in their mothers’ care 
was in the best interests of children.”).
124 Id. at 50.
125 Id. at 63. Notably, custody disputes did not often arise as they do today—as part of a divorce 
proceeding. They were more commonly brought by a writ of habeas corpus, with the noncustodial parent 
bringing suit after divorce, claiming that their child was being “wrongfully held or imprisoned.” Id. at 58.
126 Sarah Abramowicz, Childhood and the Limits of Contract, 21 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 37, 50 (2009).
127 Heinemann’s Appeal, 96 Pa. 112 (1880). 
128 Id.
129 Id. at 113.
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had thirty needles and then rubbing these parts of the body with an irritating oil.130 He 
believed that this treatment was sufficient for their medical care and refused to call a 
physician.131 After being sick for several days, his oldest child died.132 The father called 
for a physician only when his wife and other children were very near death; his wife and 
two more of his children also died.133 The court determined that the father was so 
convinced of the utility of this unorthodox treatment that he was unlikely to call a 
physician for his other children, and, in addition to his inability to provide for his 
children, decided that this meant his natural custodial rights over the children were 
secondary to the interests of the children.134 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld the 
lower court’s decree that dissolved the father’s guardianship and appointed other 
guardians for the two surviving children.135 This case followed in the tradition of cases 
finding that a father’s rights over his children were not absolute and that guardians could 
be appointed for children when a father was found to be guilty of a dereliction of duty.
Courts began to consider the best interests standard outside the context of divorce 
when considering whether to allow children to stay with families of limited means that 
had difficulty meeting their children’s needs.136 This was part of a broader movement of 
progressive reform that occurred in the early twentieth century.137 A White House 
Conference on the Care of Dependent Children was convened in 1909 by President 
Theodore Roosevelt. Its agenda was to address the following types of questions:
Should children of parents of worthy character, but suffering from 
temporary misfortune, and the children of widows of worthy character and 
reasonable efficiency, be kept with their parents—aid being given to 
parents to enable them to maintain suitable homes for the rearing of the 
children? Should the breaking of a home be permitted for reasons of 
poverty, or only for reasons of inefficiency or immorality?138
Although their conclusion was by no means universally held, the attendees at the 
conference sensibly decided against removing children from their parents strictly because 
the parents were poor.139
Additionally, over the years, many commentators criticized the tender years 
doctrine for violating the equal protection rights of men and further argued that the 
generalization that children are better off with their mothers is simply untrue in many 
                                                          
130 Id. at 112–13.
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132 Id. at 115.
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134 Id. at 112, 115.
135 Id. at 115.
136 MASON, supra note 99, at 86.
137 Id. at 87.
138 Id. at 91 (citing Proceedings of the Conference on the Care of Dependent Children, in 
2 CHILDREN AND YOUTH IN AMERICA 358, 359 (Robert Bremner ed., Harvard Univ. Press 1970).
139 Id. at 91.
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cases.140 One court even stated the following: “The simple fact of being a mother does 
not, by itself, indicate a capacity or willingness to render a quality of care different from 
that which the father can provide.”141 The Guardianship of Infants Act was revised in 
1925 to instruct judges that the child’s welfare was the “first and paramount 
consideration” in custody battles.142
The movement towards no-fault divorce and subsequent increase in divorce rates in 
the second half of the twentieth century meant that divorce cases, not cases on assigning 
custody of children whose parents had died or could not provide care, dominated the 
legal landscape.143 The best interests standard was clearly articulated as a standard for 
assigning custody after divorce and is now the leading principle applied to most, if not 
all, decisions involving children.144
There are a number of lessons we can draw from the historical development of the 
best interests standard. This history demonstrates that court intervention for the best 
interests of children has existed in some form for the last 350 years. At times, indirect 
proxies for the best interests of children have been used as the governing standard. 
Focusing on a child’s best interests has led to different outcomes depending on the 
historical context. For instance, in the late 1600s, the best interests standard required 
courts to attend to advancing the rank and increasing the wealth of a child. Under the 
tender years doctrine of the first half of the twentieth century, the best interests standard 
was interpreted to mean that young children should be cared for by their mothers upon 
the dissolution of a marriage. Today, state legislatures have uniformly adopted the best 
interests standard for resolving custody disputes, and modern day biases may similarly be 
folded into the decisions that are made.145 It is undoubtedly the case that court 
                                                          
140 See id. at 126 (“It was not only feminist rhetoric promoting equal treatment that persuaded legislators 
and judges to abandon the maternal presumption; equal treatment arguments were combined with the 
reality that great numbers of women had abandoned full-time housekeeping for the workplace, moreover, 
most of these new workers were mothers.”).
141 State ex rel. Watts v. Watts, 350 N.Y.S.2d 285, 289 (1973).
142 Abramowicz, supra note 126, at 50. 
143 MASON, supra note 99, at 121.
144 Daniel B. Griffith, The Best Interests Standard: A Comparison of the State’s Parens Patriae Authority 
and Judicial Oversight in Best Interests Determinations for Children and Incompetent Patients, 7 ISSUES L.
& MED. 283, 283, 293–94 (1991).
145 Julia H. McLaughlin, The Fundamental Truth About Best Interests, 54 ST. LOUIS U. L. J. 113, 117 
(2009) (citing ALA. CODE §§ 30–3–1 (LexisNexis 2009); ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.060 (2009); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. §§ 25–403 (LexisNexis 2009); ARIZ. LEGIS. SERV. 25,403, 25,409 (West 2009); ARK. CODE ANN. § 
9–13–103 (West 2009); CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 3000, 3080, 3100(a) (West 2009); CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 3102–
3104 (Deering 2009); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 14–10–123.5, 14–10–124, 19–1–117 (2009); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 46b–59 (West 2009); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, §§ 727–728 (2009); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16–
911 (a)(5), 16–914 (LexisNexis 2009); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 61.13(2), (6–7) (West 2009); GA. CODE ANN. § 
19–9–3(A)–(D) (West 2008); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 571–46.1, 571–46.2 (2009); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 32–
717B, 32–719 (2009); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/601, 5/602, 5/602.1, 5/607, 5/607(b)–(e) (2009); IND.
CODE ANN. §§ 31–17–1–1–5, 31–17–2–8 (LexisNexis 2009); IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.41 (West 2009); 
KAN. CIV. PRO. CODE ANN. § 60.1610 (West 2009); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 403.270, 405.021 (West 
2008); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 19A, § 1651–1654 (2009); MD. CODE ANN. FAM. LAW §§ 5–203, 5–203(D)(2) 
(West 2009), 9–102 (LexisNexis 2009); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 39D (West 2009), MASS. ANN.
LAWS ch. 208, § 28, 208, § 31, 209C, § 10 (LexisNexis 2009); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 722.26(a), 
722.27(b) (West 2009); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 518.17, 518.175, 257C.08 (West 2009); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 
93–5–24, 93–16–1 (West 2009); MO. REV. STAT. § 452.402 (West 2009); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 40–4–212, 
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interpretations of the best interests standard today reflect modern-day values. A final 
lesson is that the rights of others—particularly the rights of parents and the interests of 
the public—have been considered by courts in the earliest development of the best 
interests standard, and to the extent the modern interpretation departs from considering 
the interests of others, it departs from historical precedent. This is not to say that the 
departure is not merited in particular cases; it may well be. The point to draw from the 
history of the best interests standard is that it is only relatively recently that the standard 
has been stated as one that considers the interests of individual children to the exclusion 
of all other parties, and this development may merit further scrutiny. 
Finally, it is also important to note that although the dominant view in family law is 
that “the law of parenthood is now structured around children’s interests” and that child 
custody decisions are made under the best interests standard,146 this statement of current 
law has been called into question.147 Jill Hasday argues that parental property rights still 
play a significant role in modern family law.148 For instance, she cites the example of 
child custody law and the fact that parental rights are terminated only if there is clear and 
convincing evidence that the parent is unfit—and not terminated solely because doing so 
would be in the child’s best interests.149 Additionally, all states recognize parental 
authority to conduct corporal punishment, and parents have substantial rights over their 
child’s labor, which allows parents much more power than another employer would 
have.150 Thus, although the emphasis on a child’s best interests as trumping all other 
interests dominates the majority of case law, there are many elements of historical 
doctrines that continue to shape current law governing decisions about children. It is not 
entirely clear whether these are elements that are purely vestigial, appropriate
recognitions of the limits of court interference into family life, or designed to allow
children’s interests to be balanced against the interests of others.
                                                                                                                                                                            
40–9–102 (2009); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 42–364, 43–1802 (2009); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 125C.050, 
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B. Criticisms of the best interests standard
There are various conceptions of the best interests standard, and one difficulty in 
evaluating the standard is that it can mean very different things. Before discussing the 
criticisms of the standard, it would therefore be helpful to clarify the different versions of 
the standard that are worth analyzing. One scholar has argued that there are two 
important ways to consider a child’s interests: as (1) the paramount consideration or (2) a 
primary consideration.151 The difference between these two is that if a child’s best 
interests are the paramount consideration, a child’s interests trump all other interests and 
considerations. If a child’s best interests are a primary consideration, other interests may 
trump the child’s interests, depending on the circumstances.152 An additional clarification 
is that the best interests standard is typically understood to govern decisions made by 
parents or guardians that are later subject to judicial review. Some of the criticisms of 
pediatric research and the best interests standard take issue with the primary role that 
parents are meant to play and the amount of discretion that parents generally receive, 
rather than the standard itself, and therefore do not relate to the arguments herein.
1. Criticisms of best interests as the paramount consideration
The strict version of the best interests standard, where a child’s interests are 
paramount, has been heavily criticized. As Robert Mnookin has explained, “[t]he very 
words of the best-interests-of-the-child principle suggest that the judge should decide by 
choosing the alternative that ‘maximizes’ what is best for a particular child.”153 It may be 
relatively easy to consider a child’s best interests as paramount when choosing between 
two (or a few) options. For instance, in custody disputes, the question before a court is 
typically which parent should get primary or sole custody, or whether both parents should 
have joint custody. Choosing the option that best serves the child’s interests might be 
relatively straightforward. However, aside from emancipating minors who seek judicial 
approval to care for themselves, judges do not have the power to simply take the child out 
of his or her parents’ care and place that child into the care of other people the judge 
knows would be better parents for that child. So even if applying the best interests 
standard in this case is a little more straightforward, the best interests standard is not 
being applied to all aspects of the decision—it only applies to a small set of choices that 
are available to the judge. 
In more general decisions in which there are numerous options, the best interests 
standard as a paramount consideration becomes very difficult and demanding. Jon Elster 
calls the standard “unfeasibly demanding of agencies charged with the care of 
children.”154 For instance, Elster points out, “[i]t might be in the best interests of a child 
                                                          
151 Archard, supra note 13.
152 Id. (“[T]he real contrast is between a paramount consideration that trumps all others and a primary one 
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that her guardian give up every waking minute to her care. But no adult should have to 
sacrifice her own welfare for that of her child.”155 Promoting a child’s best interests 
above all other considerations would require a great deal of resources devoted to each and 
every child, which would prevent parents from acting in ways that benefit people who are 
not children. Even if a child were to be slightly inconvenienced in order to allow a parent 
to spend time writing a novel, talking with a friend, or helping elderly parents, the best 
interests as paramount standard would not permit these kind of trade-offs, and it is not 
clear why these should be impermissible.
There are many other examples of the potentially overwhelming implications of the 
best interests standard. Consider all of the things that courts could require parents to do to 
improve their children’s lives. Because of financial constraints, lack of time, or even 
other competing projects, parents frequently fail to give their children much of what 
would be in their best interests. For instance, children are routinely deprived of music 
lessons, the ability to learn a second or third language, organic food, their own bedrooms, 
a stay-at-home parent or a nanny, a parent’s undivided attention, exposure to artistic and 
cultural activities, the ability to live in a relatively hazard-free environment, the best 
educational opportunities, ownership of a pet, parents who live together, and much more. 
Part of the important work of parenting involves setting limits on a child’s demands in 
order to raise a child who can function socially and cooperate with others. There are 
many reasons that parents may not be able to provide certain goods for their children (or 
may not want to), but being a parent is incredibly hard work as it is. If courts required 
parents to do as much as possible to serve their children’s best interests, parents would 
not be able to do much else. Furthermore, no matter why parents fail to abide by the best 
interests standard to this extent, it is not clear that the state has the power to enforce the 
best interests standard in this way. As Justice Stewart expressed:
If a State were to attempt to force the breakup of a natural family, over the 
objections of the parents and their children, without some showing of 
unfitness and for the sole reason that to do so was thought to be in the 
children's best interest, I should have little doubt that the State would have 
intruded impermissibly on ‘the private realm of family life which the state 
cannot enter.’156
If the state was able to disrupt family life at a moment’s notice, the state would interfere 
significantly with constitutional guarantees of privacy and reproductive freedom. The 
state would have to develop a general policy of extensive interference into the assignment 
of parental rights in order to enforce this version of the best interests standard. As Jon 
Elster explains: 
If the best interest of the child is indeed the value guiding the law, one 
might wonder why courts or welfare agencies are not allowed to remove a 
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child from perfectly fit biological parents when other parents are available 
who would provide even better for the child.157
It is also unclear that government agencies are competent to assign children to their 
best parents. Finally, systematic and significant state involvement in parenting would 
disrupt the emotional attachments parents form with children, generate a great deal of 
uncertainty about the law, and create disincentives for having children.158 If children 
could be taken from parents whenever it was in their best interests, this “would create so 
much uncertainty among parents, with subsequent lack of emotional attachment to their 
children, that the net effect would be to harm children in general.”159 Elster therefore 
concludes that a “paramount” best interests standard would actually undermine its own 
goals.160
2. Criticisms that apply to both versions of the best interests standard
The flaws with the paramount interpretation of the best interests standard discussed 
above are fairly clear, but both the paramount and primary interpretations share a number 
of additional limitations. Both interpretations are problematic because the best interests of 
the child are often difficult to discern as they rely on a narrow conception of what counts 
as being in a child’s interests, and fail to take account of the budding autonomy that 
children have and interests of others. 
Nevertheless, it is important to point out that some commentators have endorsed 
the primary interpretation of the best interests standard. For instance, recognizing that the 
best interests standard would be “incoherent or self-defeating” if it required every child to 
have the best, Loretta and Arthur Kopelman have argued that the best interests standard 
can be understood to take account of the interests of others.161 Loretta Kopelman explains 
the use of the best interests standard in the law as follows: “Judges focus upon the needs 
and interest of particular children, but not to the exclusion of others’ rights or interests, to 
determine which of the available options is best, assuming some option is minimally 
acceptable.”162 Kopelman explains that choices consistent with the best interests standard 
“are usually less than ideal but better than barely tolerable.”163 The problem with this 
version of the best interests standard is that it is not a very clear standard. In particular, 
the standard does not expressly indicate which trade-offs are acceptable and which are 
not. 
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Even if the best interests of a child are only a primary consideration or something 
more like a “standard for reasonableness,” it may be very difficult to apply in practice 
because it is hard to know what is actually in a child’s best interests. Robert Mnookin has 
been a prominent critic of the best interests standard for its indeterminacy. He argues that 
the standard is very difficult to interpret because it requires predicting the future 
outcomes of various options for that child, and because there is no societal consensus on 
what values are most important with regard to how children are raised and what best 
promotes a child’s welfare over time.164 He also points out that judges have to find some 
way to figure out which values will promote a good life, or the best life, for that child, 
and there is no clear way to do that in our pluralistic society.165 Furthermore, he argues 
that determining what will be in a child’s best interests requires predicting that child’s 
future.  
Finally, Mnookin points out that the best interests standard is easier to apply in 
contexts like dispute resolution in custody battles, where the parents have invited courts 
in to help them resolve the dissolution of a marriage. But it may be harder to apply in 
other cases, and defining the scope of this function requires addressing “profound 
questions of political and moral philosophy concerning the proper relationship of children
to their family, and the family to the state.”166 For custody disputes in which courts have 
a less problematic role to play, Mnookin concludes that the best interests standard is not 
perfect, but is the best of the available alternatives.167 For child protection decisions or 
other types of cases, Mnookin recommends more determinate standards and protections 
against excessive state intrusion.168
The best interests standard has also been criticized for taking a narrow view of what 
is in a child’s interests. In their seminal book, Beyond the Best Interests of the Child, 
Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit argue that the best interests standard does not give sufficient 
weight to psychological well-being.169 They propose a “least detrimental alternative” 
approach, which involves ensuring that the child spends a maximal amount of time with 
the parent who promotes the child’s psychological well-being (or, as they describe it, the 
“psychological parent”).170
Another problem with the best interests standard is that it assumes that a child’s 
welfare is always the most significant consideration as far as that child is concerned. 
However, children develop increased autonomy over time, and courts sometimes take the 
autonomy interests of children into account in a way that contravenes the best interests 
standard. Simply put, respecting an individual’s autonomy sometimes requires allowing 
that individual to act against his or her interests. In rare cases, courts have allowed minors 
to refuse lifesaving treatment under the mature minor doctrine. States have allowed 
minors to refuse treatment if the minor is close to the age of eighteen, or if the minor and 
                                                          
164 Mnookin, supra note 153, at 264.
165 Id. at 260–61.
166 Id. at 265.
167 Id. at 282.
168 Id. at 277–79.
169 Id. at 247.
170 JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, ANNA FREUD & ALBERT J. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 99 
(1979).
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parents are in agreement about the refusal of medical treatment, and that something 
important values are at stake. For example, the case of In re E.G. involved a seventeen-
year-old girl who was a member of the Jehovah’s Witnesses, a faith that forbids the use 
of blood transfusions.171 She was likely to die within a month without the transfusions, 
but would have an 80% chance of achieving remission with the transfusions, and a 20%–
25% chance of cure.172 The Illinois Supreme Court determined that E.G. had the right to 
make her own decisions.173 First, the court explained: “Although the age of majority in 
Illinois is 18, that age is not an impenetrable barrier that magically precludes a minor 
from possessing and exercising certain rights normally associated with adulthood. 
Numerous exceptions are found in this jurisdiction and others which treat minors as 
adults under specific circumstances.”174 The court balanced the maturity of the minor 
against the state’s interests in preserving life, protecting third parties, preventing suicide,
and maintaining the ethical integrity of the medical profession.175 The court’s opinion 
spoke to the ability mature minors have to make their own decisions about their medical 
care under the law. The Illinois Supreme Court explained that mature minors had the 
legal authority to refuse treatment,176 even in life and death decisions. Of course, there 
may be ways to consider decisions like these as in the broader interests of the children 
involved. Based on their own religious beliefs, it is in the interest of a Jehovah Witness to 
refuse blood transfusions. Yet a legal standard that allows for a very broad interpretation 
of one’s interests may not provide sufficient guidance for courts and thereby lead to 
considerable variability in its application.
For the purposes of analyzing the legal treatment of research, perhaps the most 
significant concern about the best interests standard is that it does not clearly allow for 
other people’s interests to be taken into account. The paramount version of the best 
interests standard fails to account for the other interests that also matter—the interests of 
people other than the child. Taking the best interests of a child to be a primary 
consideration does not solve this problem. This approach still suggests we should focus 
our attention on the individual child, and does not provide a clear explanation of when we 
can legally deviate from that focus or when a child’s interests might be less important 
than the interests of others. The interests of other children and of other adults should also 
count in decisions that affect one particular child. Parents have duties to others, including 
duties to their other children and the family as a whole, that may often conflict with the 
interests of a particular child.177 There is no reason to think that in every conflict, the 
interests of one individual child can trump all others. The best interests standard fails to 
resolve what a parent should do if the interests of one child conflict with those of another. 
                                                          
171 In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d 322, 323 (Ill. 1989).
172 Id.
173 See id. at 326.
174 Id. at 325 (noting the emancipated minor exceptions for children who are married or pregnant and that 
children under the age of eighteen can be tried as adults).
175 Id. at 328.
176 Id. The lower courts involved in this case had found the parents to have committed neglect, and the 
Illinois Supreme Court directed the lower courts to expunge this finding.
177 See Robin S. Downie & Fiona Randall, Parenting and the Best Interests of Minors, 22 J. MED. & PHIL.
219, 222–23 (1997).
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Outside of the family context, there are many other ways in which the interests of 
others seem to have greater weight than the interests of children. Children can be required 
to go to school to fulfill the state’s need to have an educated citizenry, even if they are 
talented artists who would benefit much more from having time to explore the world and 
to engage in art. To promote the public health, schools can require children to be 
vaccinated, even when the vaccine poses risks and the chance that the child would have 
contracted a disease that is almost eradicated is slim to none. Children with 
communicable diseases are typically required to stay home from school, rather than infect 
others, even if they will miss out on important lessons. Some children volunteer their 
time to help others in various ways, including participating in activities like Habitat for 
Humanity or other charitable pursuits. This is thought to be a good way to instill in 
children the importance of helping others, and is not an activity for which a parent would 
have to get court authorization, even if it does not directly promote the child’s interests. 
Parents also often try to instill in their children a sense of obligation to their families and 
communities by asking them to make contributions for others. 
Elster also argues that the best interests standard is unjust towards parents because 
it does not factor in their interests. In particular, he notes that the standard would be 
unfair if it required “small gains in the child's welfare achieved at the expense of large 
losses in parental welfare.”178 Courts are in fact sometimes prevented from applying the 
standard when it conflicts with parental religious rights.179 The state and federal 
constitutional guarantees to free exercise of religion bind courts to disregard the best 
interests standard in some cases.180 In one California case where a parent’s religious 
rights trumped the interests of the child, a dissenting judge was so troubled by the 
majority opinion that he stated the following: 
I must confess my complete inability to reconcile the concession made in 
the majority opinion that as a consequence of awarding the custody of the 
child to appellant he will be subjected to a teaching which “obviously is not 
for the best interests of the child” with a profession of obedience to the 
unquestioned dictate of the law that “the best interests of the child is the 
polestar of decision in custody cases.”181
                                                          
178 Elster, supra note 157, at 20. 
179 See Joanne Ross Wilder, Resolving Religious Disputes in Custody Cases: It’s Really Not About Best 
Interests, 22 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL L. 411, 421–423 (2009). One difficulty that courts rarely deal 
with is how the parent’s right to free exercise of religion extends to a right to control the religious 
upbringing of their children. It is clear that some additional right must be operating here, or else parents 
would only have rights over their own religious practices, and not the religious beliefs of their children. 
Courts appear to combine the parental right to free exercise of religion, a concern for family privacy, and 
the state’s interest in pluralism to reach the conclusion that parents can develop their children’s religious 
beliefs. If, however, a teenager were to reject his parent’s religious beliefs, it is not clear that courts would 
endorse parental action that favor the parent’s religious views over the teenager’s. Determining when 
parental authority arising from free exercise rights no longer extends to children (even if it does not cause 
them harm) is a challenging task that may require some theoretical treatment.
180 See id.
181 Quiner v. Quiner, No. 29840, 1967 Cal. App. LEXIS 2452, at *83 (Cal. App. 2d. May 25, 1967) 
(Herndon, J., dissenting).
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Parental religious rights are often given greater weight than the best interests standard, 
and some commentators have argued that when parental religious rights are at stake, the 
best interests standard is replaced by something like a “substantial harm” standard.182
There are also situations in which parents’ own exercise of religious preferences will 
affect the children. The starkest way to put this is: What happens when a parent’s 
decision based on religious preferences might threaten his or her own life, which would 
in turn have a detrimental effect on his or her children? If parents are expected to make 
decisions that are in their child’s best interests, presumably the child’s interests could 
override the parent’s ability to make decisions about his or her own life.183 In the case of 
Public Health Trust of Dade County, Florida v. Norma Wons, the court was asked to 
balance a woman’s right to free exercise of religion against her children’s interests in 
being raised by both of their parents.184 The woman was a practicing Jehovah’s Witness 
who suffered from “dysfunctional uterine bleeding,” a recurring and potentially fatal 
condition that could be treated successfully with blood transfusions.185 She had two 
young children.186 A circuit court had previously ordered a blood transfusion for Mrs. 
Wons against her wishes.187 The Florida Supreme Court declared: “While we agree that 
the nurturing and support by two parents is important in the development of any child, it 
is not sufficient to override fundamental constitutional rights.”188 The court was reluctant 
to interfere with Mrs. Wons’ right to refuse treatment and exercise her religious beliefs 
for the sake of her children. In general, it seems unlikely that any court would bar a 
competent adult from exercising a fundamental liberty interest in order to protect the best 
interests of his or her children by continuing to care for them.
The interests of people outside the family unit may also be relevant to decisions 
involving children. Rachel Dufault has argued that the best interests standard is 
problematic because, as a general matter, it does not allow children to act altruistically:
Unfortunately, the best interests of the child standard, as it now exists, 
suffers from an additional flaw: it imposes self-seeking values upon 
children. It permits children to act only when it is in their best interest, 
thereby foreclosing the possibility of altruistic or humane behavior. Such 
an impoverished vision of children based on net benefits fails to recognize 
the human element of childhood. Perhaps, then, what is most 
objectionable about the standard as it now exists is not that it imposes 
values on children, but that the values it imposes are the ‘wrong’ ones, i.e. 
                                                          
182 Wilder, supra note 179, at 421.
183 See Rosamund Scott, Autonomy and Connectedness: A Re-evaluation of Georgetown and its Progeny, 
28 J. L. MED. ETHICS 55, 55 (2000). 




188 Id. at 97–98 (citing St. Mary’s Hosp. v. Ramsey, 465 So. 2d 666 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); In re
Osborne, 294 A.2d 372 (D.C. 1972); In re Estate of Brooks, 32 Ill. 2d 361 (1965); Mercy Hosp. Inc. v. 
Jackson, 489 A.2d 1130, 1130 (1985); In re Brown, 478 So. 2d 1033 (Miss. 1985)) (holding “that the 
state’s interest in maintaining a home with two parents for the minor children does not override Mrs. Wons’ 
constitutional rights of privacy and religion.”).
NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY     [2013
152
they are too narrow. A better judicial approach to the best interests test 
would be one that nurtures altruistic tendencies and recognizes that 
children, as well as adults, enjoy giving for the sake of giving, and not just 
for some tangible reward.189
Other commentators, drawing on Dufault’s argument, have similarly argued that the best 
interests standard fails to capture the fundamentally altruistic nature of certain 
decisions.190 These authors proposed a solution: restructure the standard such that a 
minor’s wishes to be altruistic would count in deciding whether donating bone marrow or 
an organ would be in that child’s best interests.191 Of course, this could only be used if 
the child understands what it means to donate an organ or bone marrow. These authors 
also emphasized that altruism should be given additional weight in the process of 
determining whether minors can donate organs or tissue to others.192 This issue will be 
discussed at greater length in subpart III(C), infra.
Elster argues that the best interests standard must in some cases be overridden by 
the public interest.193 He points out that this occurs in cases like Palmore v. Sidoti, a 
custody dispute.194 In this case, the Supreme Court asserted the importance of the state’s 
interest in not becoming a party to unconstitutional racial discrimination.195 The Court 
determined that it could not consider the effects of racial prejudice in deciding whether a 
custody arrangement would be in a child’s best interests.196 The Court explained: 
The question, however, is whether the reality of private biases and the 
possible injury they might inflict are permissible considerations for 
removal of an infant child from the custody of its natural mother. We have 
little difficulty concluding that they are not. The Constitution cannot 
control such prejudices but neither can it tolerate them.197
Even though the Court stated that the best interests standard was the correct standard,198 it 
concluded that the likelihood that other parties would discriminate against the child could 
not be given effect by courts. Therefore, in some child custody cases, the state’s interest 
in not being a party to racial discrimination outweighs the child’s best interests. Elster 
describes cases like these as situations where the “child’s welfare must, to put it crudely, 
                                                          
189 Rachel M. Dufault, Comment, Bone Marrow Donations by Children: Rethinking the Legal Framework 
in Light of Curran v. Bosze, 24 CONN. L. REV. 211, 237 (1991).
190 Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Victoria Welsz & Craig M. Lawson, Advancing the Rights of Children and 
Adolescents to be Altruistic: Bone Marrow Donation by Minors, 9 J. L. & HEALTH 213, 229 (1994).
191 Id. at 243–244.
192 Id. at 244–245.
193 Elster, supra note 157, at 26.
194 Id.
195 Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984).
196 Id.
197 Id.
198 Id. (“In common with most states, Florida law mandates that custody determinations be made in the best 
interests of the children involved.”).
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be sacrificed for the greater good.”199 He also argues that it is similarly a reasonable
policy to think financial status should not be taken into account in custody 
determinations, even if one parent’s greater wealth could be beneficial to a child.200
Finally, Elster worries that if the best interests standard is subject to so many 
problems in different contexts, “one might expect courts to find it difficult to apply it 
literally.”201 He concludes that judges do not acknowledge this difficulty overtly, and 
instead contort the best interests standard by fitting other interests into it and considering 
them instrumental to promoting the child’s interests.202
In sum, a standard that takes the best interests of the child as paramount is self-
defeating and difficult, if not impossible to implement. A standard that considers a child’s 
best interests to be primary is less obviously problematic, but still presents serious 
difficulties because of its limited ability to take account of the interests of others. What is 
unclear from the existing literature is which version of the best interests standard is 
predominantly used in medical decision making. 
The only way to be certain how the best interests standard is applied in medical 
cases is to survey the available medical cases and see whether the criticisms that have 
been articulated are real concerns. Do courts consider a child’s interests in a narrow sense 
(i.e., health-related interests), or do they also factor in a child’s psychological, emotional, 
and other interests? Are a child’s best interests typically understood to be the paramount 
consideration, or are they more often considered to be a primary consideration? And if 
courts use one interpretation or another more frequently, how often do they fail to 
account for relevant considerations because of the use of the standard? The next section 
contains an empirical analysis of the best interests standard to help answer these 
questions and determine whether the best interests standard is operating as it should in the 
medical context, including but not limited to clinical research. 
III. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE BEST INTERESTS STANDARD IN MEDICAL DECISION
MAKING INVOLVING CHILDREN
It is not entirely clear how the best interests standard operates in medical decisions 
involving children. One of the clearest statements about the law applying the best 
interests standard to medical treatment was included in a 1983 report from a presidential 
commission, and subsequently quoted in a 1986 Supreme Court opinion:
                                                          
199 Elster, supra note 157, at 26.
200 Id. at 27. Notably, this differs from the interpretation of a ward’s best interests in the early days of 
jurisdiction over guardians, when financial considerations were determinative.
201 Id. at 28.
202 Id. at 29 (“Instead of arguing that parental interests or the interests of children in general come into play 
when the child's particular interest is indeterminate, they take account of these interests by making them 
part of the particular child's interest. I am not suggesting that judges consciously reason in this manner, 
only that their reasoning may be influenced by interests other than the particular child's, interests that are 
irrelevant under existing law but that they feel are morally pertinent or will lead to socially desirable 
behavior. Judges, no less than others, are vulnerable to self-deception, wishful thinking, and other forms of 
motivated irrationality. Although they are somewhat subject to reality control since their decisions can be 
appealed and reversed, their mistakes are less strongly sanctioned than those of a soldier or businessman.”).
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The paucity of directly relevant cases makes characterization of the law in 
this area somewhat problematic, but certain points stand out. First, there is 
a presumption, strong but rebuttable, that parents are the appropriate 
decisionmakers for their infants. Traditional law concerning the family, 
buttressed by the emerging constitutional right of privacy, protects a 
substantial range of discretion for parents. Second, as persons unable to 
protect themselves, infants fall under the parens patriae power of the 
state. In the exercise of this authority, the state not only punishes parents 
whose conduct has amounted to abuse or neglect of their children but may 
also supervene parental decisions before they become operative to ensure 
that the choices made are not so detrimental to a child's interests as to 
amount to neglect and abuse.
. . . [As] long as parents choose from professionally accepted treatment 
options the choice is rarely reviewed in court and even less frequently 
supervened. The courts have exercised their authority to appoint a 
guardian for a child when the parents are not capable of participating in 
the decisionmaking or when they have made decisions that evidence 
substantial lack of concern for the child's interests.203
The President’s Commission did not, however, conduct an empirical analysis of the 
relevant legal cases to support its description of the legal landscape. One helpful insight 
from their report was to provide several structural reasons that there are so few cases in 
this area. The Commission explained that “health care professionals and institutions are 
reluctant to become enmeshed in legal proceedings.”204 It also noted that the U.S. 
healthcare system has few provisions for intervening with parental decision making. 
Child welfare agencies and courts are the actors most empowered to intervene, but they 
have limited reach. In fact, “the American legal system ordinarily relies upon the private 
initiative of individuals, rather than continuing governmental supervision, to bring the 
matter to the attention of legal authorities.”205 Although these features of the American 
legal system are structural and not substantive, they do have an important substantive 
effect on the law governing parental authority. They suggest that the law is simply unable 
to reach many decisions that parents make, and this fact effectively and dramatically 
extends parental authority. What courts do when they are faced with individual cases can 
still help us understand how the best interests standard is applied in practice, which 
version is applied most frequently, and whether applying the best interests standard keeps 
courts from being able to address the interests of others when those interests are relevant. 
                                                          
203 Deciding to Forego Life-Sustaining Treatment: Ethical, Medical, and Legal Issues in Treatment 
Decisions, PRESIDENT’S COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MED. & BIOMED. AND BEHAV.
RESEARCH 212–13 (1983).
204 Id. at 212.
205 Id. at 214.
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A. Methodology
To begin answering these questions, I undertook an empirical analysis examining 
the application of the best interests standard by courts reviewing medical decision making 
on behalf of children. I first searched the federal and state cases database on LexisNexis 
and Westlaw in January 2012 to identify the cases in the sample, and each database 
identified 259 cases.206 This first search was supplemented with targeted searches on 
blood transfusion cases207 and bone marrow donation208 cases. 
The next part of the analysis involved culling the results of cases that were not 
relevant, based on the following inclusion criteria: (1) the case was decided after 1960; 
(2) the case involved a medical decision (including abortion, bone marrow or organ 
donation, medical treatment, preventative intervention, cosmetic procedures); (3) the 
court was deciding whether to intervene, order a procedure to be performed, remove 
custody based on the decision, or provide guidance on how medical decisions should 
have been made in a particular case; (4) the case involved minors. The exclusion criteria 
were as follows: (1) the case involved decision making for an incompetent adult; (2) the 
case involved consideration of a fetus, embryo, or child who was not yet born; (3) the 
case was a criminal matter about whether a parent should be charged with neglect, abuse, 
or murder; (4) the procedure at issue was a paternity test; (5) the case was dismissed on 
procedural grounds; and (6) the court was involved in creating or adjudicating a custody 
agreement. Cases before 1960 were excluded because time could be a significant 
confounder. Reporting before 1960 appeared to be much less consistent; there was 
approximately one case each decade before 1960, but many per decade after that time 
period. Therefore, to advance the goal of this project—to study a finite population and 
capture the full universe of cases within a particular time—cases before 1960 were 
eliminated from the sample.
Snowball sampling was employed to ensure that the sample was complete. Each 
case that was found in the original search was shepardized209 to identify more cases, and 
the results of these searches were subjected to the inclusion criteria listed above. Cases 
                                                          
206 For this search, I used the following search string: “best interest!” w/s standard OR test & medic! w/s 
deci! w/p child w/s parent!. Although these initial search terms may seem somewhat restrictive, the general 
approach of using a broad search based on the best interests standard was markedly inefficient. Fewer than 
9% of the cases identified by this general search were relevant. The bulk of the cases that were identified
involved custody disputes. Broader searches were even less efficient. Conducting a search on Westlaw 
yielded slightly different results than the LexisNexis search. The Westlaw search added eight new cases to 
the sample, but merely duplicated some results by identifying fifteen cases that had already been identified 
with the LexisNexis search. The bulk of the cases were identified through cases cited in the opinions 
identified, finding cases that the cited the cases identified, and more targeted search strings like the ones 
described below.
207 This search used the following search terms: “best interest!”AND (child! OR minor) AND (blood w/s 
transfus!) and yielded 279 initial results.
208 This search used the following search terms: “best interest!” AND (child! OR minor) AND (“bone 
marrow” w/s transplant) and yielded 28 initial results. A third search was performed on cases involving 
vaccines, but proved too overinclusive to be useful (“best interest!” AND (child! OR minor) AND health! 
AND (vaccin! OR immuniz!) AND NOT “Vaccine Act”).
209 “Shepardizing” is a method to locate decisions that are based on previously identified prior precedent 
from Shepard's Citations, which are books listing published reports of appeals court decisions that cite a 
particular prior case.
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that met the inclusion criteria were also shepardized, and so on. Finally, cases cited 
within the body of judicial opinions that were part of the sample were also included and 
evaluated according to the inclusion and exclusion criteria listed above. The final sample 
consists of 101 cases.
For each case in the sample, the following data were collected: year decided; 
question before the court; what the treatment or procedure was; whether the treatment or 
procedure in question was lifesaving; whether there were alternatives to the treatment or 
procedure; whether the issue involved abortion, bone marrow donation, vaccines, or 
surgery; whether the definition of the best interests standard was that the child’s interests 
are a primary consideration or the paramount consideration (separated into considering 
only interests that were narrowly related to the physical health of the individual child 
versus considering broader interests, such as the interest in having a sibling survive), or 
whether there was no standard articulated; whether religion was at issue; what the age of 
the child was; and the holding.
The limitations of this strategy are that it is unclear whether all of the cases on 
medical decision making on behalf of children have been included in LexisNexis or 
Westlaw, and whether the strategies employed herein were successful at identifying all of 
the relevant cases in these databases. It is possible that state cases in particular are 
underreported, and that controversial cases may be over-reported.
B. Results
The cases that have invoked the best interests standard in medical decision making 
involve a variety of interventions. The largest category of cases (16/101) involved 
decisions about blood transfusions, but the rest of the cases spanned interventions ranging 
from cardiac surgery to sterilization to psychiatric medication. Although the National 
Commission assumed that most cases invoking the best interests standard in medical 
decision making were likely to involve life-or-death decisions, more than half of the 
cases (61/101) did not involve potential lifesaving interventions. 
With regard to the definition of the best interests standard that was used by courts, 
forty-three considered the child’s best interests as paramount with a narrow conception of 
what counts as the child’s interests; twelve considered the child’s best interests to be 
paramount, but with a broad conception of the child’s interests; and forty-four considered 
the child’s interests to be a primary consideration. Thus, in more than half of the cases 
(56/101), the court considered the child’s interests to be paramount. And in a majority of 
those cases (44/56), courts considered the child’s interests in a narrow sense, and only 
weighed considerations about the child’s health. 
In cases involving potentially lifesaving blood transfusions to which parents had 
religious objections, in all but two cases, courts found it acceptable to order the 
transfusion over the parent’s objection. Only in two cases where the child involved was 
seventeen years old and expressed the same religious view as the parents did the courts 
allow the decision to stand. In cases in which courts ordered the transfusion to take place, 
the courts used a variety of different standards. Two courts did not use the best interests 
standard at all, and instead used a standard of what was in the state’s or public’s interest. 
Eight courts used a nuanced version of the best interests standard that took other’s 
interests into account (best-interests-as-primary), three courts used a narrow conception 
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of the child’s best interests as paramount and only referred to health interests, and one 
court used a broad conception of the child’s interests but still held the child’s interests to 
be paramount. In this category of cases, the best interests standard therefore seemed to 
provide limited, if any, guidance to courts in reaching the outcome.
Another interesting set of cases involved sterilization of mentally disabled children. 
Of the eight cases in the sample, six used a best interests as paramount standard with a 
narrow conception of the child’s interests and placed the child’s welfare above all else. 
Even though these courts ostensibly used the same standard, in two of those cases, the 
courts permitted the sterilization, and in four of those cases, the courts did not. In one 
case, the court used the best interests standard but considered the child’s interests in a 
broad way (beyond merely medical interests), and remanded for further consideration in 
proceedings in which the child would be represented by counsel. Finally, in one case, a 
court declined to pick a standard and simply permitted sterilization because it had been 
permitted in similar cases.210
One interesting example comes from the sample in which the court treated the 
child’s best interests as paramount, and considered only narrow health interests of the 
child.211 In the case of In re A.W., the court noted that sterilization is a special and fraught 
issue and that parents should not be allowed to make the decision without court 
intervention. The court required evidence showing that there was a need for sterilization 
and that sterilization was in the child’s best interests. The court did not think it was 
permitted to consider the parental interests involved. It is possible that there are important 
historical reasons that the sterilization of mentally disabled people should be handled 
very carefully. Yet, a parent who is responsible for raising a mentally disabled child who 
cannot protect herself adequately or make sound decisions may have a very legitimate 
concern about that child being sexually active (or, more troublingly, sexually assaulted), 
and about the subsequent responsibility for a grandchild that would fall on the parents. 
Whether these kinds of considerations should be taken into account or not, the court in 
this case felt prohibited from doing so because of the best interests standard.
These sterilization cases illustrate three concerning features of the use of the best 
interests standard. First, it is not clear that the standard is used consistently to determine 
the outcome. Even though two courts cited the best interests of the child as paramount 
and only considered a child’s health interests, these courts still felt they could authorize 
sterilization. The four other courts that used the same standard did not reach the same 
conclusion. Given that the facts of the cases were not significantly different, it seems that 
some courts applied the standard incorrectly. Second, the paramount version of the best 
interests standard may seem to prevent consideration of relevant information, like the 
burden on caretakers who might have to care for a developmentally disabled child and his 
or her children. Last, the best interests standard likely obscures some of the bases for 
particular decisions reached by judges. There is vast literature on the sterilization of 
incompetent persons, and at various points in our history, mass sterilization campaigns 
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have been carried out in an incredibly troubling fashion.212 As the court expressed in In re 
A.W., “This record of past abuses necessitates governmental protection of a mentally 
retarded person’s rights. . . . [S]terilization is a special case which requires more than 
parental consent. Rather than parents or guardians, a court, using uniform criteria, must 
be the ultimate arbiter on this matter.”213 This history likely informed the decisions 
reached by the judges in these cases, and may have constrained some of them from 
ordering sterilizations in particular cases for fear of abuse of that power by the state. The 
best interests standard makes it difficult to account for these considerations, and thereby 
contributes to decision making that is insufficiently transparent.
A final point to draw from these data is that they are consistent over time, and the 
use of the best interests as paramount standard by courts is not a relic of the past. Since 
the year 2000, there have been twenty-six medical cases that involved the best interests 
standard. In seventeen of those cases, judges considered the child’s best interests to be 
paramount, and fifteen of those cases also took a narrow view of the child’s interests. 
Despite considerable criticism of this impoverished approach to a child’s interests in the 
literature and case law, courts are still applying a problematic version of the best interests 
standard.
C. Discussion of results
These results raise two important questions that will aid in their interpretation. 
First, why are judges invoking a version of the best interests standard that has been 
subject to sharp criticism? Second, is the use of the paramount best interests standard 
largely rhetorical, or is it leading courts to worrisome conclusions in particular cases?
1. Why do judges use the best interests as paramount standard?
There are a number of possibilities that could explain why judges are commonly 
invoking the best interests as paramount standard. An obvious reason is that the literature 
about the best interests standard has not had much of an impact on judicial decision 
making or the statutes that inform particular cases. Even if that is true, however, the fact 
remains that there are obvious problems in using and applying the best interests as 
paramount standard. Other parties, including parents, are likely present when these 
decisions are being made, and it seems unlikely that courts are willing to disregard their 
interests entirely. In some cases, such as the sterilization cases discussed above, courts 
applying the paramount version of the best interests standard reached different outcomes, 
even with similar facts. What is it about the paramount standard that makes it so 
attractive for judicial decision making?
Perhaps judges are merely applying the best interests as paramount standard as a 
legal fiction. A legal fiction is a statement that is treated as true for some legal purpose, 
even if it is not actually true in fact or in its application to a particular case.214 Legal 
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fictions have many different motivations. With regard to the best interests standard, 
perhaps courts, like most actors, strive to describe their actions in the best light possible. 
Protecting children’s interests and privileging them above other considerations sounds 
like a worthy goal to which courts should aspire. The court may set its sights on an 
approach that would be the most desirable, all else being equal. The court may not be 
able to reach that idealistic goal, however, because there are important and competing 
considerations to weigh in the balance.
As Lon Fuller explained, judges create legal fictions not so much out of “some 
instinct for self-deceit, as to an impulse toward harmony and system. By giving to the 
new law the verbal form of the old it facilitated its absorption into the existing corpus of 
rules.”215Another related purpose behind legal fictions can be an aspirational goal—the 
desire to put the court’s decision in the best light possible. Legal fictions can be intended 
to set the court’s sights on an approach that would be desirable in the abstract. All things 
considered, however, the court may not be able to reach that idealistic goal if there are 
competing considerations the court also has to weigh. Peter Smith has argued that 
“judges’ factual assumptions often reflect their aspirations for society and the law, even if 
those aspirations are unlikely to be realized.”216 For example, he argues that the common 
practice of using limiting instructions is a legal fiction.217 It is premised on the 
assumption that even if jurors hear damning testimony that should not be entered into 
evidence, limiting instructions can correct the error.218 Rather than confront the fallibility 
of jurors, who serve a critical role in our justice system, courts pretend that jurors 
understand and obey limiting instructions.219
More generally, aspirational fictions can be created when people confronted with 
conflicts of interest resolve the conflict by pretending it does not exist. For instance, the 
Declaration of Helsinki declares that, “[i]n medical research involving human subjects, 
the well-being of the individual research subject must take precedence over all other 
interests.”220 This language is prominent in its ethical guidance despite the fact that 
research is different from medical care, and the goal of research is to produce 
generalizable knowledge, not individual benefit. When it feels uncomfortable to 
acknowledge the true conflict between competing and important interests, it can be much 
easier to pretend that one of the interests clearly trumps. The best interests as paramount 
standard does just that with regard to decision making about children. Instead of 
acknowledging that parents, siblings, and society have interests that may sometimes 
trump the interests of a particular child, courts may often feel more comfortable declaring 
that nothing can trump the child’s interests, regardless of whether this standard is 
ultimately reflected in the decision reached.
Aspirational fictions make sense when they set a legal decision maker’s sights on 
an important goal to aim toward, even if it cannot be realized. Aspirational fictions put 
forth a decision making principle with broad appeal, like the idea of protecting children’s 
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interests and privileging them above other considerations. These fictions help courts and 
other actors describe their actions in the best light possible. 
Aspirational fictions are problematic when they hide the true character of the 
decisions judges are making, fail to give notice to the public about what the law says, or 
may make judges less attentive to other considerations that cannot fit neatly under the 
rubric of the fiction. As I have argued with a colleague elsewhere, when legal fictions are 
unacknowledged, courts that fail to realize a legal construct is a fiction may make 
inconsistent or incorrect decisions.221 The use of the best interests as paramount standard 
as a legal fiction is dangerous because it is so obscure. Many courts may not realize that 
the best interests standard is a legal fiction because it is unacknowledged. Failing to 
realize that they are dealing with a legal fiction, courts can apply the best interests 
standard strictly and neglect other important interests, as possibly illustrated by the 
transplant cases discussed above.222 Additionally, without transparency, courts will reach 
different conclusions about whether to consider the interests of people other than the 
child in very similar decisions, leading to unfairness in the judicial system.
Along with concerns about generating contradictory rulings in similar cases, 
another important question is whether the best interests as paramount standard leads 
courts to ignore relevant considerations. If there were no competing interests at stake, or 
the child’s interests are so weighty that they effectively are paramount (they do in fact 
trump all other interests, even if they would not in theory), then these results are of much 
less concern. In the next section, I demonstrate that there are specific categories of cases 
in the sample, however, that have problematic outcomes when the best interests of the 
child are considered to be paramount.
2. Does the best interests standard lead to problematic results in particular cases?
The best interests standard led to problematic results in particular cases such as: (a) 
cases involving organ or tissue donation to a sibling; and (b) cases raising public health 
considerations. 
a. Organ or tissue donation
Four cases involving organ or tissue donation to a sibling were included in the
empirical analysis herein. In these cases, there are important questions about the sibling’s
welfare that may be relevant for parents to consider in making their decision. When 
courts consider the best interests of the donating child as paramount and take a narrow 
view of that child’s interests, however, there is little room to consider the interests of the 
sibling in need of the donation. 
Some commentators argue that the best interests standard rightly would not permit 
children to serve as organ donors because the psychological and physiological damage of 
donating an organ or tissue can be significant and bone marrow donation should only be 
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allowed from legally competent donors.223 Nevertheless, it is a minority position in the 
literature that bone marrow donation should not be permitted, and many transplants are 
currently happening. The United Network for Organ Sharing has published national data 
indicating that there were 361 organ transplants from pediatric living donors in 2011.224
Because organ transplants are generally riskier and more complicated, they are likely to 
be rarer than bone marrow transplants. Thus, children are serving as organ and tissue 
donors in significant numbers, and there appear to be few court cases challenging these 
actions. 
It is possible that some versions of the best interests standard could accommodate 
organ donation. One could argue that a child who grows up in a family that has not 
experienced the death of a child is better off psychologically. Nevertheless, given the 
considerable physical risks of organ donation, the value of growing up in an intact family 
has to be balanced against the risk of harm or even death from serving as a donor. 
Although it is possible that the balance lies in favor of donation in most cases, it is likely 
to be a close enough call in some cases that court intervention would make sense. 
Courts could use the best interests as paramount standard along with a broad 
conception of the donor child’s interests, as the court did in the case of Little v. Little.225
In that case, the court considered the benefits to the donor of serving as a donor and 
continuing to have a relationship with his or her sibling.226 Depending on the physical 
risks to the donor child, it might be in the child’s best interests to obtain the 
psychological benefit of having his or her sibling survive. Although this might be true in 
particular cases, it is not straightforward to weigh this potential psychological benefit 
against the risks to that child. It is certainly possible that the child’s life could be better if 
the sibling was not around to take the parent’s attention. This kind of reasoning would 
require a cold calculation of the interests of the children and an understanding that these 
interests might actually compete. And something about this reasoning seems flawed. 
From a parent’s perspective, it would seem better if a parent were to be primarily 
motivated by the benefit to one child and the lack of significant harm to other. But the 
best interests as paramount analysis does not allow for balancing the interests of multiple 
children in its focus on only one child, even though making family decisions in that way 
seems artificial and even incorrect.
When the risks of serving as a donor are minimal, and the chance that the donation 
will save the life of one’s sibling is very high, it seems eminently reasonable for one 
sibling to help the other. For example, if one child needed blood to save his or her life, 
and a sibling could donate the blood at minimal risk of harm, the parents could and 
should be able to consent for one child to donate blood to the other. When the interests of 
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one’s siblings are sufficiently weighty, such as when a life is at stake, then it would seem 
particularly troubling if a child who was able to make decisions could simply disregard 
his or her siblings’ interests. In most families, the interests of one’s siblings are expected 
to be a relevant consideration. If children were raised in such a way that they refused to 
consider how their actions would affect their siblings, many would consider these 
children selfish and uncaring. 
Significantly, the paramount standard with a narrow interpretation of interests
actually places parents in an untenable position when one child needs an organ or tissue 
donation from another. The parents would be required by the standard to authorize the 
donation on behalf of the child whose life could be saved, but would simultaneously be 
required not to authorize the donation on behalf of the child who would be serving as the 
donor. Although some commentators argue that the way to resolve this conflict is to take 
the decision making out of the hands of the parents altogether,227 this solution would take 
the decision away from those who know the children best and would make it even more 
difficult to think about the interests of the family as a unit. Identifying a decision maker 
who is free of any conflict of interest may mean choosing a person who lacks the relevant 
information to make a good decision. Moreover, the conflict could not be entirely 
eradicated, as the decision maker would likely have to rely on the people who are 
considered to have a conflict for some of the information needed to make a sound 
decision. The existence of a conflict may in fact be relevant to the decision. Parents know 
the needs of their children and the family as a whole, and they are therefore best placed to 
balance competing interests when there is a conflict. Some have even argued that 
requiring separate donor advocates “under cuts the primacy of parents as the principal 
protectors of their children and communicates that clinicians and policy makers do not 
consider parents trustworthy in this most intimate setting.”228
The best interests standard seems to have led to problematic decision making in at 
least one case in the sample—the case of In re Richardson.229 In this case, a husband sued 
his wife to prevent her from consenting for one of their children to serve as an organ 
donor for the other.230 Their daughter needed either a kidney transplant or dialysis to 
prevent her death, and their 17-year-old son Roy was by far the best match.231 Roy had a 
mental disorder that gave him the mental capacity of a 3- or 4- year-old child, and a life 
expectancy of 25 years.232 The court applied the paramount version of the best interests 
standard to the case and a narrow conception of the interests of the child. As a result, the 
court found that “surgical intrusion and loss of a kidney would clearly be against Roy’s 
best interest,” so it could not be permitted.233 The court also rejected the argument that 
Roy would benefit from the transplant because his sister would be able to care for him if 
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his parents passed away, finding that argument too speculative.234 The court consistently 
applied the best interests standard but in a way that arguably discounted the interests of 
the family as a whole and did not allow for consideration of other important interests. 
Freed of the constraint of the best interests standard, the court likely would have more 
carefully considered the interests of the family as a whole and the relationship between 
Roy and his sister, as later courts addressing similar questions did.235
The court failed to consider relevant family interests in this case. As Mark Cherry 
has explained, “families accept a wide range of choices that are in the best interests of the 
family, but not necessarily in the best interests of any particular child (such as moving to 
accept a better paying job in a city with greater pollution or an increased crime rate).”236
Trade-offs and compromise are a natural result of living together. For this reason, valuing 
the institution of family may require that courts refrain from intervening, even when the 
choices made are inconsistent with the best interests of each individual child.
b. Cases involving public health considerations
Another category of cases where the best interests standard leads to problematic 
results involves public health considerations, which perhaps raises more important 
questions about the application of the best interest standard to pediatric research. Public 
health is “the societal approach to protecting and promoting health.”237 In general, public 
health measures seek to improve population health in a manner that may require 
individuals to bear risks or burdens, and thereby are inconsistent with the best interests 
standard. The values behind public health are different from the values that define other 
areas of medicine.238 Vaccination may be the most obvious example of a public health 
measure that applies to children, and one in which there are other important interests at 
stake, including the public’s health and parent’s rights to free exercise of religion. All 
states have laws requiring vaccination against various diseases as a condition of 
enrollment into public school.239 There has been a great deal of controversy about 
vaccination and a number of anti-vaccination groups have risen to prominence at 
different times in American history. However, political challenges to vaccination policies 
were rarely successful and became much less frequent as overall childhood health 
noticeably improved in a manner that was attributed to vaccination.240 In fact, “[b]y the 
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mid-1950s, it was arguably settled law that school vaccination mandates were 
presumptively valid.”241
More than a century ago, the Supreme Court addressed whether states have the 
authority to mandate vaccination more broadly—not merely as a requirement for 
enrolling in public schools—in the case of Jacobson v. Massachusetts.242 In this case, the 
Court reviewed a Massachusetts law that required the people living in a city or town be 
vaccinated when the Board of Health determined it was necessary to safeguard the public 
health.243 The Court found that requiring vaccination is one of the “manifold restraints to 
which every person is necessarily subject for the common good,”244 analogizing to
quarantine or the military draft.245 The Court determined that it could only intervene if 
the state’s exercise of power was arbitrary and unreasonable or far beyond what was 
needed.246
There were six cases involving vaccination in the sample, and four of them 
explicitly weighed societal interests in their decision making even while referencing the 
best interests standard. Significantly, some courts dealing with the difficulties of applying 
the best interests as paramount slipped from a best interests of the individual child 
standard to a standard considering the best interests of children as a group. For example, 
in one case in the sample, the court found requiring smallpox vaccination was reasonable 
and a proper exercise of authority when the school board, “recognizing that smallpox is 
an acute and highly contagious disease necessitating strict measures of treatment and 
control, determined it was for the best interests of the children in its school district that 
vaccination against smallpox be compulsory.”247
The reason the court used the best interests standard in such a strained way is clear. 
Whether to mandate vaccination is not an individualized decision but a public health 
decision. For an individual child, vaccination is sometimes not in that child’s best 
interest.248 The goal of vaccination is to create herd immunity to reduce the number of 
infections that occur and spread in a community.249 It may not make sense for an 
individual to take on the risks of being vaccinated if a large proportion of people in the 
community have been inoculated against the disease. The risks of contracting a particular 
illness at that point are often negligible. In attempts to eradicate diseases, this risk-to-
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benefit ratio becomes even less favorable as vaccines are administered when the chances 
of being infected are extremely low, in order to reduce those chances to zero. 
Vaccination can raise the concern that parents who opt-out act as “free riders.” 
There is a danger that some parents may take advantage of the goodwill of others by 
avoiding the risks associated with vaccination for their children but may still reap the 
benefits of herd immunity if most other parents opt in. Courts and schools struggle to 
coordinate collective action in these situations. Rather than acknowledging the collective 
action problem, these courts have appealed to the best interests standard, even though 
vaccination is likely not in the best interests of an individual child in many cases. These 
courts are departing from the best interests standard while using the best interests 
language to reach a very different outcome.
Invoking the best interests standard at a group level is not only confusing, but also 
dangerous. By using the language of the best interests standard, courts hope to make 
public health decisions seem more familiar and acceptable. This means that states could 
simply conduct a utilitarian calculus and expose some children to great risk if it resulted 
in sufficient benefit to others. Yet all states make exceptions for individual children for 
whom the vaccine is considered too risky.250 These exceptions accord with the common 
intuition that there is some unacceptably high level of risk to which children cannot be 
exposed, no matter how great the benefit to others. For example, if one child in fifty was 
likely to face an almost certain risk of death from a vaccine, and the other forty-nine 
children would face a substantial risk of a non-fatal illness if they did not receive the 
vaccine, the best interests of the group of children could be used to justify an action that 
is not in the best interests of that one child. Yet this seems to be an unacceptable way to 
treat that child. This is one instance in which the terminology of best interests is being 
used to make public health decisions sound like individualized decisions. This 
imprecision is dangerous because it fails to put the right constraints on public health 
decisions. This tendency is even more problematic in the context of pediatric research.
IV. RESEARCH SHOULD NOT HAVE TO ABIDE BY THE BEST INTERESTS AS PARAMOUNT 
STANDARD
In many medical (and other) decisions involving children, interests other than those 
of the children may be relevant. Good examples of when these interests should be 
considered arise in domains that require some individuals to take on burdens for the 
common good. This is generally the case in public health and particularly the case in 
research. 
Research is an important instance of public health decision making in which larger 
societal interests shape existing policy. Research that poses net risks should not be 
conducted if all we care about is maximizing the best interests of individual children in 
particular cases. However, research is a domain in which society benefits from generating 
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new knowledge to help people in the future, and this benefit may justify exposing 
children to some risk of harm. As discussed above in Part I, without systematic medical 
research, all children suffer from ad hoc experimentation by their physicians who have 
limited guidance for what drugs to give children or what dosages will work for them. 
Research enables practitioners to make informed and responsible decisions in treating 
children in the future. There may be times when the lack of evidence for how to treat a 
particular pediatric disease or what dose to give means that, absent research participation, 
children would be exposed to the same risks that they would be in research. In such cases, 
children may be made no worse off by their participation in research. But there are also 
times when healthy children need to be studied so medical practitioners have a better 
understanding of normal childhood development, or to serve controls to compare the 
effect of an intervention in a child with a disease to a child who is developing normally. 
There are also cases where there is so much uncertainty about benefit that it does not 
clearly outweigh the risks. Pushing past the boundaries of existing knowledge through 
research is a critical part of the medical enterprise. This necessitates exposing some 
children to increased risk for the benefit of others. This is why the U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services allows children to be subjects in medical research—to 
benefit people other than the subjects themselves.251
One critic of the current oversight system of pediatric research, Doriane Coleman, 
acknowledges that parents are granted discretion to expose children to some risk for the 
benefit of others in contexts other than research. She argues that parents would not be 
able to raise children without risk, and their intent is not to expose their children to 
harm—the harm is incidental to their intent to accomplish some other goal.252 It is highly 
unlikely that a parent who enrolls his or her child in research that involves net risks does 
so with the intent to cause harm to the child. The parent is more likely to be motivated by 
a desire to understand more about the child’s condition or to help others by contributing 
to the production of new scientific knowledge. Intent is also not the critical factor—what 
matters is whether the potential harm involved is reasonable and justified. Parents who 
have the arguably noble intent to help their child reach eternal salvation are not legally 
permitted to deny their child access to a life-saving blood transfusion. What should and 
does matter to courts is the amount of harm to which the child is being exposed that could 
easily be avoided.
Given the tremendous need to conduct research in children, and the potential 
harmful consequences of allowing the best interests as paramount standard to govern 
public health decisions in general, there are two possibilities. Either the best interests 
standard can be rehabilitated to accommodate public health decisions and pediatric 
research, or legislators should enact a different standard governing public health decision 
making for children. 
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V. REHABILITATING THE BEST INTERESTS AS PARAMOUNT STANDARD?
The fact that the best interests as paramount standard is an unacknowledged legal 
fiction does not determine what we should do about it. The next question to ask is 
whether the best interests standard can be rehabilitated. The following section presents 
several reasons why it does not make sense to retain the best interests standard. 
First, perhaps the version of the standard that considers children’s interests to be a 
primary consideration can accommodate the various exceptions discussed herein. As 
noted earlier, Loretta Kopelman has argued that the best interests standard should be 
understood as a “standard of reasonableness,” and that it actually means the following: 
“Judges focus upon the needs and interests of individual children, but not to the exclusion 
of others’ rights or interests, to determine which of the available options is best, assuming 
some option is minimally acceptable.”253 She also describes the duty to protect the best 
interests of the child as a prima facie duty that can be overridden by other 
considerations.254 Another way of describing this approach would be to suggest that the 
child’s best interests are the primary consideration for judges, but other important rights 
and interests serve as constraints on what judges can do to advance a particular child’s 
interests. Although Kopelman’s approach is much more nuanced and reasonable than 
many others, it has several limitations. 
The first limitation, as demonstrated by the empirical analysis in this Article, is that 
Kopelman’s approach is not how judges currently interpret the best interests standard. 
This means that even if she is right about how the best interests standard should be 
interpreted, her theory does not accurately describe the state of the law and would require 
some implementation process to change the way that judges function. There may be such 
confusion about the best interests standard that there is no good way to clarify which 
version is the correct one. Kopelman’s attempt to rehabilitate the best interests standard 
but retain the name is one way to respond to the many misinterpretations and confusions 
that currently exist about how decisions regarding children should be made. A better 
approach is to abandon the best interests standard in favor of a more accurate description 
of the standard that should be applied. Attempting to rehabilitate an existing standard that 
is easily misunderstood would be difficult and would lend itself to further imprecision. It 
is much cleaner theoretically to develop a better theory of what courts should be doing, 
and it also seems more likely that abandoning the standard will clarify the law.
Second, the “standard of reasonableness” view still fails to adequately or 
transparently account for the interests of others. In particular, it does not account for 
cases when the interests of another party are primary, such as cases in which the religious 
rights of a parent trump a child’s interests,255 or where the interests of a sibling in need of 
bone marrow trump the interests of a child who could serve as a donor. Courts do not 
choose the best option for a particular child while also accounting for other interests in 
those situations, nor is it necessarily what they should do. Third, it is not clear how the 
standard for reasonableness accommodates developing autonomy. Kopelman’s standard 
does not clearly allow for situations in which children are able to make autonomous 
                                                          
253 Kopelman, supra note 162, at 273. 
254 Id. at 282.
255 Pub. Health Trust v. Norma Wons, 541 So. 2d 96, 97 (Fla. 1989).
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decisions on their own, or for the possibility that some children might be able to have 
enough budding autonomy that their voices should be part of the decision-making 
process.
Another related approach would be to retain the best interests standard but expand 
the definition of what counts as being in the best interests of a particular child. Many of 
the competing interests that I have identified, such as parental interests, might be deemed 
to be promoted to the extent that they are indirectly in the best interests of children. 
Respecting parental rights and interests allows parents to do the difficult work of helping 
children develop so that they are someday able to function as adults. This provides an 
instrumental justification for parental rights as a way to promote the interests of children, 
so is seemingly consistent with applying the best interests standard but at a policy, rather 
than individual family, level. In support of this view, the Supreme Court has explained 
that deference to parents can be consistent with the best interests standard because 
“historically it has recognized that natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the 
best interests of their children.”256
As noted at the start of this Article, however, the Court has also recognized that 
many other important considerations are also relevant when decisions are about children 
or for children:
“The best interests of the child,” a venerable phrase familiar from divorce 
proceedings, is a proper and feasible criterion for making the decision as 
to which of two parents will be accorded custody. But it is not traditionally 
the sole criterion—much less the sole constitutional criterion—for other, 
less narrowly channeled judgments involving children, where their 
interests conflict in varying degrees with the interests of others.257
Trying to rehabilitate the best interests standard as Kopelman has suggested is unlikely to 
resolve the existing confusion, and cannot accommodate all cases that matter. There are 
some things that are not indirectly in the best interests of particular children, but that pose 
reasonable risks and burdens and greatly advance the public interest. Using a broad 
notion of “indirect interests” may fail to capture some very important trade-offs that 
should be made. It may also prevent the trade-offs from being made in a careful way that 
ensures that individual children are not exposed to unacceptable or unjustified risks.
Consider situations that pose significant risk but offer considerable psychological benefit. 
For instance, if a child was very committed to the environment and a parent wanted the 
child to participate in a hunger strike in order to save a section of the woods in the 
neighborhood that had a lot of meaning to that child, it is highly unlikely that a court 
would or should consider participating in the hunger strike to be within the child’s best 
interests.
Perhaps another approach to keeping the best interests standard could be to imagine 
the best interests standard as a standard that sets initial duties that are later subject to side 
constraints. This is again something like what Kopelman suggests and may also be close 
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to Paul Litton’s view. Thus, the child’s best interests are generally what drive decisions, 
but other considerations place important limits on how far we can go to promote or 
maximize a child’s interests. This approach has some virtues, but it is still an 
insufficiently transparent standard for providing guidance for particular court decisions. 
We need at least some sense of which considerations are legitimate and can be balanced
against the interests of the child. It would be better to be clear that the interests of others, 
the interests of the family, and the budding autonomy of children are the types of 
considerations that should count. Presumably, the profits of drug companies would not be 
enough for a court to override the best interests of a particular child, but it is not clear 
whether allowing for side constraints would allow for drug company profits to trump in 
particular cases or not, and the standard provides limited guidance for what should count. 
We also need to know how much we can sacrifice with regard to the child’s interests. 
Suppose a child’s sibling needs a bone marrow transplant. Are the potential donor’s 
preferences a relevant side constraint? What about the needs of the sibling? Would the 
needs of another child who could also use the transplant be relevant? It is not at all clear 
how to determine what counts as a relevant side constraint, let alone how to apply the 
relevant side constraints to this case. 
A fourth possible way to remedy the problems with the best interests standard is to 
consider it the correct standard, but to require courts to consider best interests of any 
individual child as a subjective matter that has to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. 
Under this argument, any standard would operate at a very general level, and courts 
would then have to do the hard work of applying it to individual cases. This would 
explain the wide variation in case law to some degree, and would make it clear that the 
best interests standard could not be made more accurate, because it requires so much 
discretion in applying it to a particular case. It is likely true that the best interests of most 
children vary dramatically, and that it is very difficult for courts who know very little 
about the children affected by the decisions to know what is actually in the best interests 
of those children. The fact that a child’s best interests really depend on that child’s nature 
is a good reason to think that a great deal of discretion should be vested in people who 
know the child best—most often the child’s parents. Yet, as evidenced by many cases 
discussed herein, courts are frequently faced with decisions that require considering 
interests other than the child’s best interests. In those cases, courts sometimes defer to 
parents, while at other times take account of parental interests, state interests, or family 
interests. When courts balance competing interests, they often do so not because of the 
subjective nature of a child’s interests—they do so because the child’s interests are not 
the only ones that matter.
More fundamentally, all of these potential solutions depend on the ability to 
educate judges that the best interests of the child should not be the paramount 
consideration. The question then becomes whether courts could somehow be educated on 
the difference between the two different standards and required to apply the best interests 
as primary standard to most cases without some more dramatic change in the law. In this 
vein, Jill Hasday argues forcefully that the canon of family law has promulgated the view 
that the child’s best interests are the determinative factor in cases involving children.258
Noting that “[t]he academic community’s scholarship . . . helps to create, shape, and 
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perpetuate the family law canon,” she proposes that family law scholars and casebook 
writers in particular endeavor to correct the errors in the family law canon and challenge 
conventional wisdom by clarifying how the law actually works.259
This strategy may be one important way to change the inaccurate and widespread 
perception that a child’s best interests are the deciding factor for any case involving 
children, and allow us to recognize the fact that decisions involving children affect other 
parties in important ways, including parents, siblings, extended family, and even society 
at large. The problem with this strategy is that despite decades of criticism about the best-
interests as paramount standard, courts continue to apply that standard. Given the amount 
of criticism about the best interests standard in the existing literature, it seems unlikely 
that further clarification in the literature will ameliorate this problem. 
Even if the standard were improved, it is hard to see how the best interests standard 
could help us answer the crucial question of when courts should permit children to be 
exposed to risk, and how we can best balance the interests of children with the interests 
of others in policy decisions. One reason for this may be that the terminology of the best 
interests standard itself is confusing. If the child’s best interests are the subject of the 
standard, it is very difficult to know how to incorporate the interests of others. Finally, 
failure to remedy this problem could have dramatic consequences. It may take just a few 
misguided decisions to have a chilling effect on pediatric research that could have 
disastrous implications. 
For these reasons, it seems much more useful to develop a new, clearer standard 
that more explicitly accounts for the relevant considerations, and to have this new 
standard implemented by legislators. This standard, if carefully calibrated, could be 
applied to an even wider variety of cases. Below, I propose the “secure child standard” to 
remedy the deficiencies of the best interests standard that so many have identified. The 
secure child standard better captures the complexity of legal decision making involving
children.
VI. AN ALTERNATIVE: THE SECURE CHILD STANDARD
Abandoning the best interests standard is only advisable if there is a better way to 
understand how the law should treat decision making about children. As an alternative, I 
propose the “secure child standard,” under which courts should defer to parental decision 
making unless the child is exposed to some unjustified risk of significant harm. When 
courts review parental decisions, the secure child standard requires that they take into 
account the relevant parental, child, and state interests to determine whether the risk is 
justified. The secure child standard permits exceptions in certain cases. For instance, 
when children are able to make autonomous decisions of their own, parents may have to 
cede authority for decision making to children. Courts should also retain some power to 
intervene if children seek to undertake unjustified risks of significant harm. Unless 
children are deemed capable of making decisions for themselves, however, the secure 
child standard would not permit parents or the state to expose an individual child to harm 
above a certain threshold.
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An important contribution of the secure child standard is to account for harms 
courts themselves may cause. When there is no significant harm to prevent, courts may 
cause greater harm to the child by interfering with the family. The threshold for court 
intervention should take this potential harm into account. 
When there is some chance of significant harm to the child, the secure child 
standard recognizes particular times in which independent review of parental decision-
making is important. Where the probability of significant harm is very low, parents 
should balance the risks of harm against the potential benefits for the child, the family, 
and society. Courts may still intervene if there is reason to suspect the decision is being 
made without good reason justifying the risk of harm. When there is a reasonable chance 
of serious harm, parents again decide whether there is good and sufficient reason to
permit the harm. If the trade-off is between a benefit for the child and a risk of harm to 
that child, courts should give parents fairly wide latitude to make decisions. In areas 
where people other than the child have important interests at stake, such as public health, 
research, or when a sibling is in great need, courts may permit parents to make decisions 
that may expose a child to some risk of significant harm, but independent scrutiny should 
serve as a protection to ensure that parents do not expose their children to risk without 
sufficient reason. Courts should acknowledge that under the U.S. Federal regulations, 
pediatric research is subject to limitations on risk and prior review by IRBs,260 and the 
protections specified in the regulations and IRB review may serve as a sufficient check 
on parental decision-making in most cases. Defining what counts as significant harm and 
when the likelihood of harm is sufficiently high to be concerning may be difficult, but the 
standard at least provides more explicit guidance for judges about what they should be 
focusing on, and greater transparency in judicial decision making, than the best interests 
standard. Additionally, determining what justifies exposing children to risk will likely 
require more work, and may be something that is developed further through the 
accumulation of precedent over time. The need for an exercise of judgment cannot be 
eliminated entirely, but the advantage of the secure child standard is that the correct 
criteria are made explicit. 
Finally, even with justification, there are some risks that are unacceptably high 
under the secure child standard. Specifying when risks are unacceptably high is a difficult 
task and will require some additional work to generate useful guidance for courts making
these determinations. Clearly, exposing one child to an almost certain risk of death for the 
benefit of others should never be tolerated by parents or courts, but it is likely that the 
threshold of risk that can be legally tolerated is much lower than that. One way to specify 
levels of acceptable risk would be to analyze the data about what risks are considered 
justifiable in the routine decisions parents and policymakers make, which is an effort in 
which some scholars are currently engaged.261
Besides its greater fidelity to what courts actually do, as has been shown 
previously, the secure child standard is preferable to the best interests standard for several 
reasons. First, courts can enforce the secure child standard while taking into account 
other relevant interests. These other interests include important competing considerations 
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like religious beliefs, a minor’s growing autonomy, other family interests, and important 
societal interests (e.g., education, medicine, public health). This standard better captures 
the careful balancing in which courts should be, and often are, engaged.
The secure child standard also does a better job of allowing courts to incorporate 
respect for a child’s developing autonomy than the best interests standard does. During 
adolescence, children mature and develop abilities that are recognized in the law. These 
abilities allow children to make decisions for themselves in ways that may or may not 
promote their own best interests. The secure child standard simply does not apply in 
situations where teenagers should be treated as competent adults who are free to exercise 
their autonomy to make decisions that may be good or bad for them. Although parents 
typically retain considerable authority to make many decisions for their adolescents, 
parental authority is much more easily overridden or may not be required in certain 
circumstances. Parental authority to provide permission for an adolescent for a wider 
range of activities may not be required when the minor is deemed to be emancipated or 
mature.262 Emancipated minors are able to make their own decisions in ways that may not 
be in their best interests.263
The secure child standard is especially useful to account for societal interests that 
are at stake in legal decisions involving children. Public health and medical research are 
two areas where courts have struggled to factor in societal interests and harmonize them 
with the best interests standard. The secure child standard recognizes that there are times 
when children should be permitted to do things for the benefit of others, or for the greater 
good. However, it also acknowledges that there should be legal limits on the amount of 
sacrifice an individual child can take on for the benefit of others. Using the best interests 
standard as applied to children as a group, as courts have tried to do in vaccine cases, 
fails to place the important limit on the amount of risk an individual child can be exposed 
to for the benefit of others. Rather than referring to best interests at all, it would be better 
to acknowledge the trade-off more directly. In the areas of medical research or public 
health, courts should recognize that there are important societal interests at stake that may 
justify exposing individual children to some risk of harm. One especially valuable 
contribution of the secure child standard is to place a limit on the amount of harm that 
                                                          
262 Jessica A. Penkower, Comment, The Potential Right of Chronically Ill Adolescents to Refuse Life-
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children can be exposed to, so as to avoid the consequentialist conclusion that it would be 
acceptable to severely compromise the interests of some children for the greater good.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, I have shown that courts use the best interests standard in two major 
ways. They consider it the paramount consideration or a primary consideration. The best 
interests as paramount standard is an unacknowledged legal fiction that has implausible 
consequences and fails to account for relevant interests. The best interests as paramount 
standard neglects many other interests at stake, which does not fit with the historical 
development of the standard and is especially poorly calibrated for public health decision 
making. The primary version of the standard is less problematic, but still fails to capture 
the importance of the interests of others. 
The best interests standard should be understood as an unacknowledged, 
aspirational legal fiction. Protecting children’s interests and privileging them above other 
considerations sounds like a worthy goal to which courts should aspire. However, the use 
of the best interests standard as a legal fiction is dangerous because it can obscure the 
sometimes illegitimate considerations that are taken into account in cases involving 
children. In particular, courts that take the best interests of the child as the paramount 
consideration write opinions that are internally inconsistent, difficult for others to 
understand, that do not give appropriate notice to the public about which activities are 
permissible and which are not, and that may sometimes even reach the wrong result. 
Thus, ridding ourselves of the best interests standard would enable courts and policy-
makers to reason clearly and correctly, without the constraint of a hidden legal fiction.
Abandoning the best interests standard requires a more coherent theory about how 
decisions for children should be made. To that end, I propose the secure child standard: in 
legal decisions involving children, parents should have discretion to make decisions for 
their children, and courts should intervene to prevent unjustified risks of significant harm 
to the child. When there is a risk of significant harm, courts should determine whether 
parents have appropriately balanced the competing considerations, and should not allow 
children to be exposed to unjustified harm or harm that is unacceptably high. Under the 
secure child standard, courts can begin to acknowledge the tough decisions they make 
involving children. This increased transparency will allow the law to grow without 
tortured or confusing reasoning. Abandoning the best interests standard will also help to 
develop sound standards for pediatric research and public health more generally that 
appropriately balance the interests of children with the interests of everyone else. The 
secure child standard has the potential to ensure that courts, parents, and the state are able 
to act in concert to protect children as they should. 
